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TRUST AND THE REFORM OF SECURITIES REGULATION
BY RONALD J. COLOMBO'
ABSTRACT
Trust is a critically important ingredient in the recipes for a
successful economy and a well-functioning securities market. Due to
scandals, ranging in nature from massive incompetence to massive
irresponsibilityto massive fraud,investor trust is in shortersupply today
than in yearspast. This is troubling,andcommentators,policy makers, and
industry leaders have all recognized the needfor trust's restoration.
As in times ofsimilarcrises, many have turnedto law and regulation
for the answers to ourproblems. The imposition of additionalregulatory
oversight, safeguards,and remedies, some advocate, can help resuscitate
investor trust. These advocates have it halfright.
For trust is complicated,and exists in a variety offorms. Someforms,
predicatedprimarilyupon reasonedcalculation, respond well to law and
regulation. But otherforms, predicatedprimarily upon relationship and
emotion, respondpoorly to law and regulation.In fact, these latterformsof
trust can be seriously harmed by legal intervention. Wise policymakers
would carefully assess the nature of whateverparticulartrust relationship
they wish to strengthen before taking action to ostensibly strengthen the
trust in that relationship.
Unfortunately,such an assessment has not been partofthe significant
securities law reforms recently proposed. As such, some of these reforms
threaten to undermine, ratherthan enhance, the remainingsupply of trust.
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INTRODUCTION
Trust is a critical, if not the critical, ingredient to the success of the
capital markets (and of the free market economy in general). As Alan
Greenspan once remarked: "[O]ur market system depends critically on
trust-trust in the word of our colleagues and trust in the word of those with
whom we do business."' From the inception of federal securities legislation
in the 1930s, to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, it has long been
understood that in the face of economic calamity, the restoration and/or
preservation of trust-especially investor trust-is paramount in our
financial institutions and markets.2
And if further proof of the indispensability of trust was needed, it has
been forcefully provided by the financial services industry crisis and the
unusually strong recession that afflicted much of the globe throughout 2008
and 2009. By most accounts, a breach of trust-in the form of fairly reckless
risk-taking by some, and in the form of dereliction of duty by others-has

1R. William Ide III & Douglas H. Yarn, Public Independent Fact-Finding: A TrustGeneratingInstitutionfor an Age of CorporateIllegitimacyand PublicMistrust,56 VAND. L. REV.
1113, 1114 (2003) (quoting FederalReserve's Second Monetary Policy Reportfor 2002: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and UrbanAffairs, 107th Cong. 11 (2002) (statement of

Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)); see also Elizabeth
Warren, Wall Street's Race to the Bottom, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2010, at A19 ("Banking is based on

trust.").

2

See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote:
Towarda More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 140-41

(2006).
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precipitated the crisis and, indirectly, the recession.' The lack of trust that
these breaches engendered has figured prominently in the persistence of our
economic woes, from banks fearful of lending to investors fleeing the capital
markets.'
Adding to this is an uptick in fraud reminiscent of the EnronWorldCom-Global Crossing era of approximately a decade ago. From
Bernie Madoff to Marc Dreier to Allen Stanford (among, sadly, many
others), securities fraud (and Ponzi schemes in particular) appears to be en
vogue once again.' Much of this fraud (as is usually the case with fraud in
general) was made possible by trust and its breach. Understandably and
predictably, this uptick in fraud-remarkable in both frequency and
severity-has further contributed to the erosion of investor trust and
confidence.'
Consistent with the historical pattern of U.S. securities regulation, the
current economic crisis, coupled with a spate of corporate scandals, has
given rise to calls for a re-examination of our current regulatory regime and
the enactment of a host of reforms..' The reforms suggested and enacted are
typical of past reform efforts: they generally entail the imposition of greater,
rather than lesser, regulatory oversight, and involve the promulgation of

3

See generally Peter Gakunu, The 200 7-2008 crisis- a breakdown oftrust?,NEW EUROPE,
Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.neurope.eu/articles/90474.php (discussing the role of trust in relation to
the sub-prime mortgage and financial sector crisis).
4

See Jamie Dimon,A UnifiedBankRegulatorIs a Good Start,WALL ST. J., June 27,2009,

at A13 ("... no discussion of the future of the financial system can be complete without an
acknowledgment of the industry's responsibility to re-earn the trust of the American people."); see
also Paul Hannon, ForeignInvesting Falls 39%, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2010, at Al3 (discussing the
reduction in overseas investment); John D. Morley & Roberta Romano, The Futureof Financial
Regulation,57-58 (John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Econ., and Pub. Policy Research Paper
No. 386, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1415144 (setting forth President Obama's
numerous references to "trust" in his speeches regarding the financial crisis). Some scholars suggest
that mistrust of such a degree threatens the legitimacy of corporations themselves. See Ide 1H &
Yarn, supra note 1, at 1114-15.
5

See,

e.g.,

Tina

Brown,

Did

We

All

Go

Mad?,

http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2008-12-15/did-we-all-go-mad/

DAILY

BEAST,

(Dec. 15, 2008,

7:30 EST); Frank Pasquale, A Total Breakdown in Trust, CONCURRING OPINIONS,

http://www.concurringopinions.com (Dec. 13, 2008, 15:40 EST).
6
Cf Daniel Henninger, In Government We Trust?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2009, at Al l ("I
believe Madoffs massive and destructive breach of trust had an effect on the public mind that
carried beyond the tragedy of its immediate victims. After Madoff, John Q. Public set the bar really
high for anyone seeking a big commitment of trust with money.").
7
See generally John H. Walsh, A Simple Code ofEthics: A History ofthe MoralPurpose
InspiringFederalRegulation ofthe SecuritiesIndustry, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015, 1035-37 (2001)

(Discussing the motivations of the Roosevelt administration in regulating the securities industry).
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more, rather than fewer, rules and regulations upon the world of finance and
business.!
A critical assumption undergirding much of this reform is that
regulation can restore investor trust and confidence. Or, if such a restoration
cannot be effected, the assumption is that regulation can at least serve to
bridge the chasms created by the deterioration of trust and confidence,
thereby providing a means for marketplace participants to once again safely
connect and transact with one another.
But do these assumptions hold? A critical set of questions should be
considered. Can regulation serve to bolster and repair relationships
dependent upon trust? And in the absence of trust, can regulation serve as
an effective substitute to trust? In short, are there limits to the ability of
regulation to resuscitate an economy that has suffocated due to lack of trust?
Conversely, can regulation work to "crowd out" trust, effectively
transforming relationships that once were close and trustworthy to arm's
length and legalistic? Could regulation serve to displace relationships of
trust with transactions subject merely to the "morals of the marketplace"?
Although additional research (especially multidisciplinary, empirical
research) is needed to resolve many of the preceding questions, the last
couple of decades have, fortuitously, witnessed an explosion of excellent
scholarship exploring the phenomenon of trust.I The present world situation
invites, if not demands, a review of this scholarship at this time. Indeed, this
scholarship is more timely and relevant today than when it was originally
authored.
This article hopes to employ the literature on trust to evaluate our
traditional regime of securities regulation-along with recently enacted
reforms thereto. Although the literature on trust has been applied to
corporate law,'" contract law," partnership law," and even health law," it has

8
See Ripken, supra note 2, at 140-41(describing the background to the passage of the
Sarbanes Oxley Act).
9
Especially significant, and foundational, within the field of corporate and commercial law

are TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE AT ACROSSROAD
(2006); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust andTeam Productionin Post-CapitalistSociety, 24 J. Corp. L.
869 (1999); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundationsof CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001); Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust,

93 GEO. L. J. 1457 (2005). Two other important works addressing trust, but within the larger
context of social capital, are FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE
CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995) and ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE
AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
'0E.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 9.
"Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, Contract Law and the Economics of
InterorganizationalTrust, in TRUST WITHIN AND BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS 146, 146-47 (Christel
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not been applied to the law of financial regulation-at least not to any
sustained degree, and certainly not since the recent crisis which has,
arguably, exposed significant shortcomings in the U.S. securities regulatory
regime.14
This article will proceed in three parts. Part I will set forth a summary
of the existing research on trust. It will address what trust is, how trust is
earned, and how trust is destroyed. It will also address the interplay of law
and trust, and why trust is indispensible to the capital markets.
Part II will examine three specific areas within the field of securities
regulation that have received most of the attention of reformers: brokerdealer regulation, investment adviser regulation, and hedge fund regulation.
This section will first assess whether the law's traditional approach to each of
these areas served to support, versus undermine, trust. Part II will thereafter
examine whether the reforms brought about by the Dodd-Frank Act in each
of these areas are likely to enhance, versus enervate, trust.
Part III will briefly consider the dark side of trust: its breach.
Moreover, Part III will address the challenge of attempting to simultaneously
increase trust while, at the same time, protecting those individuals who
might misplace their trust.
In concluding, this article joins the chorus of those who sing of the
indispensability of trust to well-functioning free markets. Unfortunately,
trust is a fragile commodity. Breaches of trust, especially repeated, frequent,
severe, and widespread breaches-such as those abounding in our era-do
great damage to it. Fortunately, in some contexts, law and regulation can
serve to increase and safeguard trust. Unfortunately, in other contexts, law
and regulation can serve to undermine trust. The key for policymakers is to
distinguish between the two contexts, and proceed accordingly.
For the most part, our traditional regime of securities regulation
generally proceeds appropriately. That is, relatively speaking, greater
regulation has been traditionally imposed upon those areas in the securities
industry where such regulation is trust enhancing, and lesser regulation is
imposed upon those sectors where such regulation is trust defeating.
Regrettably, the same cannot be said, generally speaking, of the
reform proposals considered by this article. Efforts to indiscriminately
ratchet up the overall level of regulation on financial services professionals
Lane & Reinhard Bachmann eds., 1998).
12Reza Dibadj, The Misguided TransformationofLoyalty into Contract,41 TuLSA L. REV.
451 (2006).
"Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REv. 463 (2002).
14The exception to this is an earlier piece of mine, in which I addressed the role of trust with
regard to financial services regulation generally. See Ronald J. Colombo, The Role of Trust in
FinancialRegulation, 55 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
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ignores the lessons taught by trust scholarship, and risks undermining the
very trust that is hoped to be restored.
I. TRUST
Before examining how financial regulation negotiates the
phenomenon of trust, this article shall first summarize and review the
literature on trust per se. The first half of this undertaking shall concern
itself with trust generally: how it is created, destroyed, and rehabilitated.
The second half of this undertaking shall address the importance of trust to
the free market.
A.

Trust Defined

As a preliminary matter, what exactly is "trust"? Different scholars
define the phenomenon of trust in different ways," and it is critical to nail
down the meaning of the term for purposes of this article before proceeding.
At its simplest level, trust can be defined (as per Tamar Frankel) as
"believing that others tell the truth and will keep their promises."'" More
detailed is the definition proposed by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout: "a
willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another, based on the belief that
the trusted person will choose not to exploit one's vulnerability."" This
definition lines up well with Jay Barney and Mark Hansen's "strong form" of
trust," which served as the basis of Larry Ribstein's scholarship on trust."
As Ribstein formulated it:
Strong form, or "principled," trust arises . . .where the trustor
is technically free to breach but "opportunistic behavior would
violate values, principles, and standards of behavior that have
been internalized by parties to an exchange." Trust in this form

"Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness,Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. &

ECON. 453, 453 (1993) ("As the literature on trust reveals, and as developed here, 'trust' is a term
with many meanings.").
' 6 Frankel, supra note 9, at 49.
"Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 1739-40.
"See Jay B. Barney & Mark H. Hansen, Trustworthiness As a Source of Competitive
Advantage, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 175, 175 (1994).
"See Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 557 (2001).

20 10]

TRUST AND THE REFORM OF SECURmES REGULATION

8 35

arises only when the trustee is not bound by external
constraints to honor his promise.20
...

Indeed, a consensus among those who have studied the issue of trust
seems to have formed around this definition-the root of which is
"vulnerability":
Trust experts all seem to agree that trust is a state of mind that
enables its possessor to be willing to make herself vulnerable to
another-that is, to rely on another despite a positive risk that
the other will act in a way that can harm the truster. 2 1
Thus, this is the definition that I shall employ in this article. The
greater the extent to which a person can renege his or her promise(s) and get
away with it, the greater the extent to which a person can disappoint another
without legal, economic, or reputational sanction, the greater degree of trust
it takes to rely on (or make one's self vulnerable to) that person.
But even greater definitional complexity can (and must) be
introduced. For the willingness to make one's self vulnerable to another can
be grounded primarily in emotion, or primarily in reason."
When grounded primarily in emotion, such trust is referred to as
"affective trust," and constitutes a general, optimistic disposition that the
subject of one's trust will behave honorably and appropriately.23 Oliver
Williamson speaks of this form of trust when he describes "noncalculative"
(or, more accurately, "nearly noncalculative") trust, or "personal trust."24
Such trust is a "passion,"25 Williamson explains, and "is reserved for very
special relations between family, friends, and lovers. Such trust is also the
stuff of which tragedy is made. It goes to the essence of the human
condition."26 This form of trust is fairly consistent with Claire Hill and Erin
Ann O'Hara's concept of "trust in"-"an attribute-based trust.""

20

d. (quoting Barney & Hansen, supra note 18, at 179).

21Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory ofTrust, 84 WASH. U. L. R. 1717,

1724 (2006).
22See
Cross, supra note 9, at 1464-68.
23

d. at 1464.

24
25Williamson,

supra note 15, at 479.
Id. at 482.
1d. at 484.
2See Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1725-26.
26

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

836

[Vol. 35

In contrast to affective trust stands "cognitive trust."28 Grounded
primarily in reason, "cognitive trust, is more of an economic or strategic
concept than affective trust."29 Reliance and voluntary exposure to
vulnerability stemming from cognitive trust is not based upon emotions or
norms, but rather "upon a cost-benefit analysis of the act of trusting
someone."" For this reason, Williamson rejects even calling such reliance
"trust."" To him, such reliance is a form of calculativeness, which serves to
economize on the scarcity of one's mental energies and time." The potential
vulnerabilities accepted are not due to "trust," but to rational risk
management-to the fact that "the expected gain from placing oneself at risk
to another is positive."" This really has very little to do with "trust" as
commonly understood, leading Williamson to remark that "[c]alculative trust
is a contradiction in terms."" Similarly, Frank Cross has observed that for
those wedded to an understanding of trust as affective trust, President
Ronald Reagan's famous standard of "trust but verify" is "virtually
incoherent.""
"Cognitive trust" lines up well with Hill and O'Hara's depiction of
"trust that."" "Trust that" trust, according to Hill and O'Hara, is essentially
predictive: it reflects a reasoned assessment that the person in whom trust is
placed "will behave in a way that is not harmful regardless of his character
type."3
Interestingly, the fundamental differences between affective and
cognitive trust are on display in their breach:
Trust theorists explain that moral outrage and indignation
flowing from a profound sense of betrayal is a hallmark of

28See Cross, supra note 9, at 1465.
29
1d
30
1d.
3
'Williamson, supranote 15, at 463.
3
1Id at 458.
3
1d. at 463.
34

d

asSee Cross, supranote 9, at 1465.
36
See Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1724-25.
"Id. at 1725. A term often accompanying or used interchangeably with trust is
"confidence." E.g., Confidence, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLIsH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 475 (1993) ("the state of one that confides: TRUST,
RELIANCE, BELIEF"). The form of trust implicated by confidence appears to be cognitive trusttrust that a particular person or institution will execute a promised performance satisfactorily. For
affective trust entails trusting in a particular person or institution generally, and as such includes
"motivations and intentions," not merely "results." Hall, supra note 13, at 474. See also Ribstein,
supra note 19, at 555 ("'Trust' differs from the decision to rely.").
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highly trusting relationships that have strong emotional content.
In contrast, violation of the more moderated type of trust
known as confidence, which has a more calculative basis, tends
to produce only disappointment in not achieving expected
results. The moral and emotional tenor of betrayal arises from
the assumptions made, and sometimes disapproved, about ...
motivations and intentions-not only about ...

skills and

performance.
Importantly, affective trust and cognitive trust differ in how each of
them interacts with vulnerability-the key to trust generally. The degree of
risk and vulnerability posed by a given transaction or situation is an
important factor in assessing cognitive trust, but not necessarily so when
assessing affective trust.
Affective trust ordinarily precedes a given transaction or situation.
Thus, when a party who trusts another (affectively) is confronted with a
potentially risky transaction," the critical question is whether the amount of
affective trust already in existence between the parties is enough to enable
the transaction to proceed, given the risks associated with it. If affective
trust is in sufficient supply, the transaction will be undertaken; if not, the
transaction will be passed upon. The primary impact that risk and
vulnerability have upon affective trust is akin to the impact of exercise upon
a muscle40 : the more that affective trust is put to use via exposure to risk and
vulnerability, the greater it grows in response.41
Vulnerability challenges cognitive trust in quite a different way.42
Increased vulnerability drives up the cost of this form oftrusting. By driving
up the cost of trusting, vulnerability immediately alters the cognitive trust
equation. Additional safeguards may be needed in order for a relationship
predicated upon cognitive trust to withstand a period of increased risk and
vulnerability.43 This exemplifies the dynamic, situational nature of cognitive
trust, which adjusts from context to context, versus the relatively static
nature of affective trust-which may indeed increase or decrease over time,

38

Hall, supra note 13, at 494 (citations omitted).
Risky in the sense that the transaction exposes the party's vulnerability to the other.
40
See ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MODERN BODYBUILDING 70-71
39

(1985).

41

Assuming, of course, a satisfactory experience on the part of the trusting party. See infra
text accompanying notes 69-70.
42
Cross, supra note 9, at 1469 ("While all trust is necessarily a 'leap of faith,' the breadth of
that leap is much narrower with cognitive trust.").
43
See Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1752-53.
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not in immediate reaction to greater risk and vulnerability, but rather in
reaction to the fulfillment or dashing of trust's expectations after the fact."
Although in theory it is possible to isolate these two versions of trust,
it is exceedingly difficult to do so in practice.45 At the extremes, perhaps, we
might encounter cases of "affective trust" on one hand (such as a transaction
between a son and his mother), and "cognitive trust" on the other hand (such
as a transaction on eBay involving total strangers). But in the vast majority
of situations, both forms of trust are likely to be implicated, and it is
probably better to conceptualize "affective trust" and "cognitive trust" as
marking two poles of a spectrum of trust relationships.46 As Hill and O'Hara
have confidently declared:
It is now understood that the distinctions between calculative
and noncalculative decision-making and between instrumental
and noninstrumental behaviors are by no means clear. Because
trustworthy behavior is very often a result of both internalized
noninstrumental values and instrumental motives, it becomes in
practice quite difficult to separate out calculative from
noncalculative trust-relevant behaviors.47
There is yet another dimension to the definition of trust that must also
be discussed before proceeding. Namely, the distinction between
generalized trust on the one hand, and confidence in one's competency,
ability, or reliability in a specific area of expertise on the other.48 What I am
defining as "generalized" trust refers to trust of a moral nature: trust in the
character, integrity, and honesty of the subject in question. What I am

"Cross, supra note 9, at 1471 ("When primarily cognitive, a person's trust will vary much
more and be more dependent upon particularized circumstances."). It should be noted that cognitive
trust also increases or decreases in response to experiences between parties, for such experiences
serve as evidence, either favorable or unfavorable, upon which to calculate trustworthiness in future
situations. See infra text accompanying notes 69-70.
45Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1727.
46See Cross,supranote 9, at 1469 ("any individual instance of trust probably contains both
affective and cognitive components").
47Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1727. This comports well with Carol Rose's view of trust
as "semi-rational." See Carol M. Rose, Trust in the MirrorofBetrayal, 75 B.U. L. REv. 531, 53435 (1995).
48See Sim B. Sitkin & Nancy L. Roth, Explaining the Limited Effectiveness ofLegalistic
"Remedies"ForTrust/Distrust,4 J. ORG. SCI. 367, 371-73 (1993). Sitkin and Roth identified the
important differences between "generalized trust" and "specific trust," albeit under a different
nomenclature (identifying matters relating to what I have labeled "generalized trust" as impacting
"distrust," and identifying matters relating to what I have labeled "specific trust" as impacting simply
"trust"). Id.
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defining as "specific" trust refers to trust of a technical nature: trust in the
capability of the subject in question to satisfactorily deliver upon a specific
promise, good, or service.
To some extent, the distinction between "generalized trust" and
"specific trust" parallels the distinction between "affective" and "cognitive"
trust, discussed previously.4 9 The principal difference between these two
dichotomies is that the affective/cognitive dichotomy is grounded primarily
in the source or cause of the trust in question, whereas the generalized
trust/confidence dichotomy is grounded primarily in the target or subject of
the trust in question. In other words, whether one's trust in another is
affective versus cognitive is largely a function of the nature of the trusting
individual (coupled with context and circumstances);so whether one's trust is
a generalized trust or specific is more a function of the individual or entity in
whom trust is being placed (again, coupled with context and
circumstances)."
In the securities industry, both forms of trust are implicated,
sometimes simultaneously. For example, most investors have confidence
(hopefully) in the fact that their brokers will properly execute a trade on their
behalf-an example of specific trust. This confidence in the broker's skill
and professionalism probably exists apart from any judgment formed about
the broker's integrity and/or moral character.52 That said, most investors
probably also have a certain degree of generalized trust in their broker as
well, and assume that their brokers, in addition to executing trades properly,
will not decide to abscond with their funds one day.
As with the distinction between affective and cognitive trust, the
generalized/specific distinction is particularly important because, as we shall
see, law and regulation appears to impact them in different ways.53
In sum, "trust" can be exhibited in forms primarily affective or
primarily cognitive. Additionally, trust can be generalized or specific.
Because of similarities in their natures, and the contexts in which they arise,
affective trust is likely to be coupled with generalized trust, and cognitive
trust is likely to be coupled with specific trust.54

9
See supra text accompanying notes 23-37.
soSee Cross, supranote 9, at 1464-67.
5
'See Sitkin & Roth, supra note 48, at 371-72.
52Cf Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1730 (observing that "trust and distrust can, and often
do, coexist").
53
See Sitkin & Roth, supra note 48, at 373-77; see also infra Part I.D (discussing the
relationship between law and trust).
54
See Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1744 (equating "specific trust" with "trust that"
[cognitive trust], and "general trust" with "trust in" [affective trust]); see also id. at 1723-27
4
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B. The Psychology of Trust
Thanks to an outpouring of research on trust over the last couple of
decades, we now know quite a bit about how trust is developed, nurtured,
maintained, destroyed, and rebuilt. This section will introduce that literature
on trust, and the following section will focus on the interplay of law and
trust.
Sociologist L.G. Zucker has identified three paths to the development
of trust: characteristic-based, process-based, and institution-based."
Characteristic-based trust "rests on social similarity and assumes cultural
congruence."" It arises from shared heritage, background, and values, and
as such is not something that can be "deliberately created."" Indeed, given
the increasing amount of diversity that marks modem nations and modem
society in general, trust based upon common characteristics "is becoming a
scarce commodity.""
Process-based trust is trust tied to interpersonal experiences between
the parties to the trust relationship." It is built up over time, incrementally,
via repeated (positive) exchanges and dealings in which trust is honored and
rewarded.' Thus, unlike characteristic-based trust, process-based trust can
be intentionally and strategically developed." That said, the mobility which
characterizes modem society significantly undermines the development of
process-based trust (which requires time and stability).62
Based neither on a shared cultural background, nor actual
interpersonal relations, institution-based trust "is tied to formal social
structures" which "protect the interests of all parties to the exchange.""
Examples of this would be "professional credential or membership ...

(defining the "trust in" and "trust that" forms of trust); see also infra Part I.B. (discussing how trust
is developed).
"Christel Lane, Introduction: TheoriesandIssues in the Study of Trust, in TRUST WITHIN
AND BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS 1, 11 (Christel Lane & Reinhard Bachmann eds., 1998) (citing
Lynne G.. Zucker, Production of Trust:InstitutionalSources ofEconomic Structure, 1840-1920,8

RES. ORG. BEHAV. 53, 60 (1986)).
"Id at 12.
58

1d See also Fukuyama, supra note 9, at 314 (identifying the "vast expansion in the
number and scope of rights to which Americans believe they are entitled" as a threat to community
and, a fortiori, to trust); see also Cross, supra note 9, at 1492-94 (citing critiques similar to
Fukuyama by Mary Ann Glendon, Philip Howard, Robert Kagan, Amitai Etzioni, and others).
"See Lane, supra note 55, at 11.
601d.
6

1Id.

6Lane, supra note 55, at 11, 21-22.
"Id. at 12.
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association[s]," "insurance," and "legal/statutory rules."' Thus, as with
process-based trust, institution-based trust "can be deliberately produced by
individuals, firms, and entire industries.""5 Given the complexity of modem
society, "where common histories can no longer be assumed," and coupled
with proliferation of international trade, the possibility of institutionally
based trust is a critically important one."
Zucker's characteristic-based trust lines up well with affective (and
generalized) trust, and helps to explain its ordinary path of development.
Zucker's institutionally-based trust lines up well with cognitive (and specific)
trust, and helps to explain its ordinary path of development."7 Finally,
Zucker's process-based trust would appear to be a route under which both
affective and cognitive trust could readily develop, given that it exhibits
features important to the development of both.
In many instances, trust may arise from a combination of sources. A
typical business relationship might, for example, begin between two former
college classmates who share a similar social and cultural background-thus
starting with a degree of characteristic-based trust. It might be further
enhanced by the credentials earned by the two former classmates since their
graduation from college-thus adding a degree of institutionally based trust.
Finally, the business relationship is likely to start off modestly, with a series
of relatively minor transactions before something more substantive and
ambitious is embarked upon in common-an example of process-based trust.
As sociologist Jorg Sydow explains:
Kinship and friendship ties as well as other reliable sources of
interorganizational trust aside, a cycle of trust almost always
begins with what might be called a policy of small steps, which
is characterized, above all, by a sparse use of resources and a
careful reference to the prevailing rules of signification and

6Id.
65
1d.
6Lane,
supra note 55, at 15; see also Tom Hayes & Michael S. Malone, The Ten-Year
Century, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2009, at A17
So how do we control this increasingly out-of-control, interlinked world? ....
Most importantly, trust will become the critical factor. Without the luxury of time,
trust will be the new currency of our times, whether in news sources, economic
systems, political figures, even spiritual leaders. As change accelerates, it will
remain one true constant.
6See
Williamson, supra note 15, at 486 (asserting that "[c]alculativeness . . . always
reappears" in settings of institutional trust); but see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance ofBeing
Trusted, 81 B.U.L. REV. 591, 609-11 (2001) (asserting that affective trust can be institutionallybased).
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legitimization. This policy may first lead to what has been
called "tentative trust," before this kind of trust changes into
more persuasive, resilient, and durable forms."
All trust, whatever its originating wellspring, "grows with use.""
Trust is maintained and nurtured via "continual positive experiences"
coupled with periodic personal interaction between the trustor and the trustee
(or a human representative of the trustee if the trustee is an institution). 0 Not
surprisingly, research suggests that trust is far easier to maintain than to
develop out of whole cloth."
But as with so many things in life, what might take years to build and
maintain can take mere moments to destroy. For trust is often quite fragile,
and even an isolated negative experience "may be reacted to with great
emotional intensity and upset trust for ever [sic]."" For, once broken, trust is
"hard to regain."7
Trust has a resilient side too, however. For "not all negative feedback
information about the trustee threatens or disrupts trust. "7 "Depending on
the circumstances and the object of trust, certain symbolic thresholds are
erected to determine when trust is considered broken."7
Of the two forms of trust, affective trust "is often stronger and more
resilient" than cognitive trust.7 ' This is not particularly surprising, since
affective trust is predicated on emotions and values usually formed over a
lifetime; cognitive trust can be generated more rapidly, after a fairly
straightforward examination or study of one's counterparty. And as
additional information is learned about the object of one's cognitive trust,
that trust can just as rapidly be increased or decreased.
Additionally, according to Sitkin and Roth, the resilience of trust is
linked to the type of violation in question. For "[c]ontext-specific

"Jorg Sydow, Understanding the Constitution of InterorganizationalTrust, in TRUST
WITHIN AND BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS 31, 39 (Christel Lane & Reinhard Bachmann eds., 1998);

see also Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1743 (noting that the initial development of trust occurs in
small steps for most people).
69
Mitchell, supra note 67, at 600.
70
See Sydow, supra note 68, at 46-49.
'See id. at 53-54 (discussing the difficulties of trust creation as opposed to trust
management).
7See Lane, supra note 55, at 23.
7Lawrence

E. Mitchell, Trustand Team Productionin Post-CapitalistSociety, 24 J. CORP.

L. 869, 870 (1999).
74
Lane, supra note 55, at 23.
75
761d&

Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1469.
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violations" that go to technical competency and related matters "can be
viewed as isolated exceptions."" Indeed, "[e]ven repeated violations of trust
can be excused as personal quirks as long as the violations are confined to a
particular domain and are not interpreted as threatening to 'spill over' into
other domains."" Hence, while such violations could very well undermine
what I have referred to as "specific trust" (one's confidence in a person to
accomplish an assigned task competently and satisfactorily)," they are
unlikely to dislodge "generalized trust" if it already exists.o
Much more serious-and potentially unforgivable-is a violation of
trust that goes to a question of values." For such violations are ordinarily
not viewed in isolation, but rather interpreted in a generalized fashioninfecting the entirety of the violator's character, and poisoning the entirety of
the trustor/trustee relationship.82 Such violations serve to reduce, if not
destroy, the generalized trust that had previously existed.83
C. The Importance of Trust
Over the past decade or so, a flurry of important works have been
authored touting the importance of trust-especially within the context of
commercial relations and the economy as a whole.84 As Nobel laureate
Kenneth Arrow explained: "'Virtually every commercial transaction has
within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a
period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic
backwardness in the world can be explained by a lack of mutual
confidence."'
This is because the transaction costs of bullet-proofing every deal and
relationship would simply be too high." Without a modicum of trust, the

"Sitkin & Roth, supranote 48, at 372.
78
1d
79
See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
8oSee Sitkin & Roth, supranote 48, at 372.
"Id.
at 371.
82

d

83

Id.; see also Lane, supranote 55, at 23 (stating that even one falsehood has the potential to
forever upset trust).
84See supra note 9. Of course, certain philosophers have understood and articulated the
importance of trust long before our present generation. See, e.g., Alison Hills, Kantian Trust, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF TRUST (2002) www.open2.net/trust/downloads/docs/kantiantrust.pdf.
Putnam, supra note 9, at 288 (quoting Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts andExchanges, 1 PHIL.
PUB. AFF. 353, 357 (1972)) (alteration in original).
86
Oliver R. Goodenough, Values, Mechanism Design, andFairness,in, MORAL MARKETS:
THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 228, 239 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008). I have
addressed the issue of transaction costs, and the need for virtue generally (not simply trust) in
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expense of protecting one's self in a transaction by monitoring the other party
and other such measures could very well exceed the value of the transaction
itself-thereby chilling commerce."
Thus, it can be fairly said that "[t]rustworthiness lubricates social [and
business] life."" As Robert Putnam explained: "Where people are trusting
and trustworthy .. .everyday business and social transactions are less costly.
There is no need to spend time and money making sure that others will
uphold their end of the arrangement or penalizing them if they don't."" This
frees up time and resources for more productive, beneficial use.
Additionally, relationships imbued with trust enable the parties thereto
to achieve higher levels of mutual satisfaction." As Christel Lane explained:
A high level of trust between exchange partners is said to
incline them towards expanding the amount of knowledge they
make available to each other. In a relationship of trust,
information exchanged may be more accurate, comprehensive,
and timely, and under conditions of high trust, developed in a
long-standing relationship, both implicit and proprietary
knowledge considered confidential is made available to the
exchange partner. Such easy exchange of information, in turn,
makes exchange partners more open to each other and thus
inclines them to explore new opportunities of collaboration,
such as the enhancement of product quality and the joint
exploitation of a new technology."
Thus, trust not only reduces the costs of transacting, it also creates
opportunities for a greater number of qualitatively richer commercial
exchanges.
Trust is especially critical to the financial services industry, as
"[f]inancial services are excellent examples of highly intangible and complex
service-based offerings."92 As a result, clients and customers are particularly
Ronald J. Colombo, Exposing The Myth ofHomo Economicus, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 737,
747, 752-53 (2009) (Book Review).
8
7See Tamar Frankel, Trust andNon-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. REV. 457,460-63
(2001); see also Goodenough, supra note 86, at 239 (noting how values such as trustworthiness
lower transaction costs).
8Putnam, supra note 9, at 21.
89
d. at 288.
9'See Lane, supra note 55, at 20.
91
1d. (citations omitted).
92
Deirdre O'Loughlin et al., From Relationships to Experiences in Retail Financial
Services, 22 INT'L J. BANK MARKETING, 522, 523 (2004); see also Sydow, supra note 68, at 33
(discussing the role of trust in the financial services industry).
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reliant upon the advice and representations
professionals-and this reliance requires a certain
situation is captured well by the title of Lynn Stout's
The Essential Foundation of Securities Markets."9 4
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of financial service
amount of trust. 93 This
article: "Trust Behavior:
As Stout concludes:

The American securities market is one of the largest and most
important institutions in our economy. By 2007, more than 91
million individual investors held a total of more than $15
trillion in corporate bonds and equities, either directly or
through pension and mutual funds. This is only possible
because many investors trust. They may not necessarily trust
individual securities professionals and corporate insiders to be
honest and dependable (although I would like to believe most
are honest and dependable, recent events do raise doubts), but
at least they trust "the system." And because they trust, they are
willing to buy trillions of dollars of securities, even when they
are not quite sure what they are buying or whom they are
buying it from.95
Additionally, there are positive externalities to trust.96 Although these
days, one does not often hear the old phrase "[w]hat's good for business is
good for America,"' bandied about, most would probably agree that greater
trust in the world of business and financial services is likely to have certain
beneficial spillover effects. And indeed, such trust can "be simultaneously a
'private good' and a 'public good."'9 For many, if not all of us, benefit when

93
See Cross, supra note 9, at 1516 ("Financial contracts may be considered 'trust intensive
contracts par excellence,' so 'trust ... should matter most for the development of financial
markets."'(quoting Luigi Guiso et al., The Role ofSocial Capitalin FinancialDevelopment 1 (Ctr
for Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 511, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf~abstractid=209610)).
94

Lynn A Stout, Trust Behavior: The EssentialFoundationofSecurities Markets, UCLA

Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-15 (2009), available at
ssm.com/abstract=1442023.
9
Id. at 14.
9Putnam, supra note 9, at 18-20 (referring specifically to "social capital," a phenomenon
itself built on trust).
97

See Lorraine A. Schmall, Women And ChildrenFirst,But Only If The Men Are Union
Members: Hiring Halls And Delinquent Child-Supporters, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.

POLY 449,461 (1992). See also Speech by Calvin Coolidge to the American Society ofNewspaper
Editors (Jan. 17, 1925), in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 736 (15th ed. 1980) ("The
chief business of the American people is business."); see also, Speech by Charles Erwin Wilson to
the Senate Armed Forces Committee (1952) ("What is good for the country is good for General
Motors, and what's good for General Motors is good for the country."). Id. at 817.
9
8Putnam, supranote 9, at 20 (referring to "social capital," which is built on trust).
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businesses and consumers can spend less time and money guarding
themselves from fraud and other wrongdoing, and more time and money on
productive pursuits (such as research and development), or simply leisure.
This is perhaps why societies marked by greater trust enjoy more than simply
enhanced business profits, but rather an increase in flourishing across the
board."
Finally, it is critically important to recognize that not all trust is of
equal quality and value. Distinctly superior are affective and generalized
trust (over cognitive and specific trust), which tolerate the least amount of
suspicion, inspire the greatest amount of honesty and sacrifice, and exhibit
the greatest resiliency in challenging and unfortunate situations. '" Indeed,
recall that some commentators dispute whether "cognitive trust" is trust at

all.'0
This qualitative divide is what has fueled commentators, such as Marc
Galanter, to denigrate the role of law and lawyers in our society (purveyors
of cognitive and specific trust) as providers of artificial trust: "[1]ike the
provider of artificial hormones that supplement the diminished supply
coursing through the body, the lawyer contrives enforceability to supplement
the failing supply of reciprocity, moral obligation, and fellow-feeling ....
Lawyers contrive to provide 'artificial trust.""0 2
Francis Fukuyama has shed light on how societies characterized by
these different forms of trust operate. Fukuyama concluded that by almost
every conceivable economic measure, societies lacking in affective and
generalized trust fare poorly when compared to societies possessing such
trust.' This is what leads Fukuyama to assert that "[w]idespread distrust ...

"Id. at 135-36. "A growing body of research suggests that when trust and social networks
flourish, individuals, firms, neighborhoods, and even nations prosper." Id. at 318. But see Cross,
supra note 9, at 1527-43 (discussing the negative consequences of trust).
1"See supra text accompanying notes 74-80; Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1725-26;
Cross, supra note 19, at 1464-68. See also Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 1750-51, 56-59 (extolling
the benefits of "trust," which the authors have defined as "internalized [affective] trust and not
calculative behavior [cognitive trust]").
'0oSee supra text accompanying notes 29-34.
102Marc

Galanter, The Facesof Mistrust: The Image ofLawyers in PublicOpinion, Jokes,

and PoliticalDiscourse,66 U. CIN. L. REv. 805, 806-07 (1998). More colorful still is Grant
Gilmore's well-known comment on the subject:
Law reflects but in no sense determines the moral worth of a society.... The better
the society, the less law there will be. In Heaven there will be no law, and the lion
will lie down with the lamb.... The worse the society, the more law there will be.
In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously
observed.
GRANT GiLMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110-11 (1977).
03

1

See Fukuyama, supra note 9, at 150-51.

Fukuyama does not refer to "affective,"
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imposes a kind of tax on all forms of economic activity, a tax that high-trust
societies do not have to pay."" In other words, what societies lack in
affective and generalized trust, they need to purchase via mechanisms that
generate cognitive and specific trust. And in so doing, "trust in the system of
law replaces interpersonal trust in individuals.""'
Where law and cognitive trust serve as a substitute to affective trust,
"parties [interact] with a high degree of wariness, [as] this form of synthetic
or rational trust extends only as far as the law's realistic protections."' 6 As a
result, such societies become simply qualitatively "unpleasant" when
compared to those where affective and generalized trust, rather than
cognitive and specific trust (generated via force and/or law) regulate
everyday life.' As Fukuyama observed:
It is perhaps easier to appreciate the economic value of
[affective and generalized] trust if we consider what a world
devoid of trust would look like. If we had to approach every
contract with the assumption that our partners would try to
cheat us if they could, then we would have to spend a
considerable amount of time bulletproofing the document to
make sure that there were no legal loopholes by which we
could be taken advantage of. Contracts would be endlessly
long and detailed, spelling out every possible contingency and
defining every conceivable obligation. We would never offer
to do more than we were legally obligated to in a joint venture,
for fear of being exploited, and we would regard new and
possibly innovative proposals from our partners as tricks
designed to get the better of us. Moreover, we would expect
that, despite our best efforts in the negotiations, a certain
number of people would succeed in cheating us or defaulting
on their obligations. We would not be able to resort to
arbitration, because we would not trust third-party arbitrators
sufficiently. Everything would have to be referred to the legal

"generalized," "cognitive," or "specific" trust in those terms, but instead distinguishes between
"high-trust" and "low-trust" societies. Id. at 10-12. A careful reading of his book TRUST reveals
that by "high-trust" societies, he is referring to societies rich in affective and generalized trust, and
that by "low-trust" societies, he refers to societies lacking in such trust, and which have instead
substituted for its lack with cognitive and specific trust supplied via force, law, and regulation. Id.
'4Fukuyama, supra note 9, at 27-28.
05
Hall, supra note 13, at 514.

10I.

7
0oPutnam, supranote 9, at 136 (quoting Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust? In TRUST:
MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 220,221 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988).
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system for resolution, with all of its cumbersome rules and
methods, or potentially even to the criminal courts.'

D. Law and Trust
Recognition of trust's importance to our economy has caused
commentators to scrutinize the ways that trust can and is impacted by law.
Scholars are at odds over law's effect on trust, with some arguing that law
enhances trust, and others arguing that law undermines trust. 109
Common ground appears to exist over the fundamental proposition
that "the rule of law is associated with significantly higher levels of trust.""
Indeed, this notion was introduced previously in our discussion of
institutionally based trust."' And this comes as no surprise, since little good
has come out of societies marked by anarchy and chaos (especially while
they are anarchic and chaotic)."' Indeed, in words particularly relevant to
this article, Francis Fukuyama wrote, "[t]here is no question that institutions
like contract and commercial law are necessary preconditions for the
emergence of a modem industrial economy. No one would argue that trust
or moral obligation alone can take their place."" 3
A more difficult question is the effect of additional law and regulation
on trust once a sufficient legal framework is already in place. In other
words, what is the impact of additional law and regulation in a society
already characterized by law and order?
In approaching this question, we must keep in mind the different
varieties of trust discussed previously: affective, cognitive, generalized, and
specific." 4 For as we shall see, law appears to operate on different varieties
of trust in different ways.

08
Fukuyama,
09

supra note 9, at 152-53.
Hill & O'Hara, supranote 21, at 1751-52; Raymond H. Brescia, Trust in the Shadows:

Law, Behavior,and FinancialRe-Regulation, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1361, 1400-02 (2009). See also
Sergio G. Lazzarini et al., Order with Some Law: Complementarity Versus Substitution ofFormal

andInformalArrangements,20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 261, 261-63 (2004) (discussing the benefits and
drawbacks of formal rules compared to informal arrangements).
0
Cross, supra note 9, at 1525; see also Martin Raiser et al., Trust in Transition: CrossCountry and Firm Evidence, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 407, 426 (2008) ("trust among businesses is
higher where confidence in third party enforcement through the legal system is higher").
"'See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
"Cf THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (asserting the necessity
and purpose of government); EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION INFRANCE 19

(Dolphin Books 1961) (1790).
"3 See Fukuyama, supra note 9, at 151.
"l4See supra Part I.A.
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For starters, recall that the essence of trust, as commonly understood,
is the decision to intentionally expose one's self to vulnerability in a given
situation or relationship."s Consider also that one ofthe primary purposes of
law"' is to reduce one's vulnerability."' Indeed, within the context of
financial regulation, this purpose can be readily gleaned from the onesentence preamble to the 1933 Securities Act: "[t]o provide full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof,
and for other purposes."" A tension immediately presents itself: how can
law serve to further trust by reducing that feature which most characterizes
the trust relationship: vulnerability?"'
To address this tension, we must identify the kind, or aspect, of trust
in question. Starting with the affective-cognitive spectrum, let us first
consider trust that is primarily affective in nature.
Recall that affective trust is fundamentally emotional, triggered by a
recognition of certain moral attributes, and grounded upon shared social
norms. 2 0 As such, it is not difficult to see why affective trust is unlikely to
be enhanced by the promulgation of protective law or regulation."' For,
unlike cognitive trust, affective trust is not the result of a "cost-benefit"
analysis on the part of the trusting party.'22 Thus, efforts to reduce the cost of
trusting in the context of affective trust (by lowering the risks associated
with the vulnerability to which the trustor is exposed), do little to enhance
the overall level of affective trust.123

usSee supra Part L.A.
" 6For the purpose of this article, "law" refers to any external, state-backed (i.e., legally
enforceable) constraints upon a party's conduct, including criminal law, contract law, securities law,
commercial law, and associated regulation. Law does not include influences upon a party's conduct
that are solely market-based or morality-based.

" 7 See Shelly George, Slipping Through the Cracks and Into Schools: The Need For a
Uniform Sexual-PredatorTracking System, 10 SCHOLAR 117, 133 (2008) ("'A central purpose of

law is to protect the weak from the strong and to compensate victims for injuries caused by
carelessness and neglect."') (quoting Todd A. DeMitchell, The InadequacyofLegal Protectionsfor
the Sexual Abuse ofStudents: A Two-Track System, 215 EDUC. L. REP. 505, 505 (2007)). Cf P.S.

ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 4 (1986) (discussing whether all contracts or promises should
create moral and legal obligations).
" 8Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (preamble) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (2006).
" 9See Cross, supra note 9, at 1482; Hall, supra note 13, at 520-21.
12oSee supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
12'See Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1725-26; see also Ribstein, supranote 19, at 563-65
(noting that regulation cannot create personal trust).
122See Cross, supra note 9, at 1465.
1'2 See Hill & O'Hara,supra note 21, at 1725-26; Cross, supranote 9, at 1482-83.
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Moreover, for a number of reasons, law and regulation can
theoretically diminish affective trust and its development.124 As previously
observed, "regulation decreases the sense of vulnerability that is critical to
[affective] trust," thus forestalling the development of affective trust by
depriving the regulated parties of this critical ingredient.'25 Trust is earned
by those who fail to take advantage of others when in a position to do so. By
limiting the opportunities to take advantage of another (via rules or
regulations that prevent misconduct, make misconduct unlawful, or
otherwise subject misconduct to sanctions), law and regulation limit the
ability of individuals and institutions to demonstrate their trustworthiness."6
Law and regulation can also transform a relationship that was initially
informal and based upon trust to something formalized, strictly
circumscribed, and explicitly based upon law (such as a detailed contract).' 27
Consider for example, the popular view of prenuptial agreements which are
"'often regarded with distrust and hostility.""28
Similarly, evidence suggests that law and regulation can "crowd out"
trust-a phenomenon whereby legal mechanisms and adherence to
regulatory standards supplant social norms and the binds of trust. 29 As Mark
Hall explains: "a heavily regulatory legal regime tends to crowd out intrinsic
motivation by replacing it with extrinsic penalties. This can undermine both
the perception and the reality of trustworthiness.".o
Further, sociologists have commented upon a "spiral of distrust" that
can emerge as relationships that once might have been based upon trust
morph into highly structured legal forms."' As layer upon layer of
monitoring agents and mechanisms are superimposed upon a given
relationship, distrust is institutionalized.'32

Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1725-26.
125Ribstein, supra note 19, at 580-81.
126See Cross, supranote 9, at 1491-92.
27
1 Ribstein, supra note 19, at 581; accord George Dent, Lawyers and Trust in Business
Alliances, 58 Bus. LAW. 45, 53-54 (2002).
128Cross, supra note 9, at 1482 (quoting Allison A. Marston, Planningfor Love: The
Politicsof PrenuptialAgreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 888 (1997)).
129See Hill & O'Hara, supranote 21, at 1725-26; Ribstein, supra note 19, at 580-81; but see
Cross,supra note 9, at 1498 (criticizing "crowding out" theories as not "logical"). Cf Paul J. Zak,
Values and Value: Moral Economics, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRTTICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN
THE ECONOMY 259, 265 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008) (discussing how rules and policies can crowd out
good behavior that people follow most of the time).
130Hall, supranote 13, at 510.
See Lane, supra note 55, at 15-16.
132See id
124See
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Law and regulation appear to have a negative effect on "generalized
trust" as well (trust in a counterparty's integrity and character, as opposed to
mere confidence in his or her technical capabilities)."' In an important
study, Sim Sitkin and Nancy Roth concluded that:
The literature also suggests that attempts to "remedy" trust
violations legalistically frequently fail because they
paradoxically reduce the level of trust rather than reproducing
trust. The adoption of legalistic "remedies" (i.e.,
institutionalized mechanisms that mimic legal forms and
exceed legal/regulatory requirements) imposes a psychological
and/or an interactional barrier between the two parties that
stimulates an escalating spiral of formality and distance and
leads to a need for more rules. And so the process is
perpetuated.' 34
Another way of looking at the problems posed by law and regulation
to affective trust is through the lens of "rights talk."' For much of securities
regulation is oriented toward investor protection, bringing with it a set of
investor rights (e.g., the right to certain disclosures). But "[t]he language of
rights and the language of trust move in opposite directions from one
another,""' and thus recognition of these investor "rights" comes at the
expense of affective trust. For "[t]he scrupulous insistence on observance of
one's rights is an admission that one does not trust. . . ."'

Put differently,

"the law's regulatory functions sometimes compete with its expressive
functions, which can be complex, unpredictable, and multidimensional."'
In light of the foregoing, should law and regulation be pared back to a
bare minimum? Not necessarily. For law and regulation may serve to
enhance trust that is primarily cognitive in nature.'"

33

See Sitkin & Roth, supra note 48, at 370.
134Id. at 369 (citations omitted); see also id. at 376; Mari Sako, Does Trust Improve
BusinessPerformance?,in TRUST WITHIN AND BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS 88, 99-100, (Christel
Lane & Reinhard Bachmann eds., 1998); but see Lazzarini, supranote 109, at 263-264 (rejecting
1

Sitkin & Roth's conclusion).
' 35See Cross, supra note 9, at 1492-94.
36
' Hall, supranote 13, at 469 (quoting Richard Sherlock, ReasonableMen and'SickHuman
Beings, 80 AM. J.MED. 2, 3 (1986)).
137ld
3

' Id. at 509.

139Despite the preceding, it should be noted that law and regulation could conceivably
promote affective trust. Instead of law and regulation as typically envisioned (as a set of mandates
and prohibitions), law and regulation with a softer touch could seed affective trust by facilitating
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Law and regulation's potential salutary effect upon cognitive trust is
not particularly surprising, given that cognitive trust is, by definition, a
decision to make one's self vulnerable based upon a weighing of the costs
and benefits associated with such vulnerability under the circumstances.'40
To the extent that law can lessen the cost of vulnerability (by reducing either
the probability or magnitude of its attendant risks), law naturally makes
trusting another (in a cognitive sense) a more attractive option.141
Law also can positively affect "specific trust."'42 Again, this result is
not particularly surprising because "specific trust" is rather narrow in
character, defined as "belief in a person's competence to perform a specific
task under specific circumstances." 43 It does not take much to see why and
how state-circumscribed standards and rules of liability can serve to increase
confidence in someone who is subject to them.'" Simply put, it is easier to
have confidence (specific trust) in a person or institution that is bound by
law to perform a service, or produce a product, that meets certain
government-mandated standards than, ceteris paribus, in a person (or
institution) who is not so bound by any such standards. As with cognitive

trust, the driving force behind the trusting party's decision-making within the
context of specific trust is not one of emotion or character. Instead, the
trustor is taking a simple calculated risk: hoping that the price he or she is
paying for a particular good or service is appropriate given the possibility
that the transaction might ultimately prove unsatisfactory. Law helps reduce
the cost of an unsatisfactory transaction, by reducing the chance of its
occurrence and/or providing a remedy if it presents itself.
So, law appears to have deleterious effects upon trust that is affective
and generalized, and positive effects upon trust that is cognitive and specific.
But what about trust that is affective and specific? Or cognitive and
generalized?
There is little shame, I believe, in admitting that existing scholarship
and research is inconclusive here. Especially because the joining of these
two forms of trust is probably quite rare: how often does one assume a
certain technical competency on the part of another (specific trust) out of an
assessment of that person's moral character? Similarly, how often does one
interaction and communication. See Cross, supra note 9, at 1500-01, 1508-12; see also Hall,supra
note 13, at 498-507 (discussing trust and law in the context of healthcare). This is not, however, the
nature of the law and regulation reviewed in this article, and thus shall not be contemplated when
reference is made to law and regulation.
140See supra text accompanying notes 28-35.
14'See Cross, supra note 9, at 1483; Williamson, supra note 15, at 477-78.
14 2See Sitkin & Roth, supra note 48, at 370.
43
1 Id at 373.
'"Id
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assume that an individual is all-around upright and trustworthy simply
because of his or her technical proficiency in a specific craft? In other
words, given the similarity of their natures, cognitive trust is, I firmly
suspect, more often coupled with specific trust (rather than generalized
trust), and affective trust more often coupled with generalized trust (rather
than specific trust)."'
Finally, before proceeding, we would do well to consider the critiques
of the argument that law can inhibit or harm trust (affective and generalized
trust). One critique posits that since "law never provides total protection for
the trusting party," law cannot truly displace trust.'46 Courts are imperfect.
Litigation is expensive, and worse yet, uncertain. The efforts of regulators
do not always meet with success. Thus, the argument goes, every transaction
contains a degree of vulnerability-and with that the seeds of affective
trust.147
This argument is certainly not without merit. It cannot be said that
even the most heavily regulated transactions are riskless. So, certainly,
opportunities to prove one's trustworthiness will always exist-regardless of
the regulatory regime in place. But the question is not one of whether any
opportunities to build trust persist under a regime of heightened regulation,
but rather whether the effect of additional law and regulation upon
relationships and transactions reduce such opportunities.
Although opportunities to earn trust admittedly still exist even after
the imposition of additional regulation, such opportunities are reduced in
number and quality. Few individuals trust each other, for example, as much

14 5See supratext accompanying notes 49-54. That said, if required to resolve the question,

it seems as though law's effect on such relationships would be governed predominantly by whether
the trust in question was affective versus cognitive (and not by whether the trust was generalized or
specific). For the affective-cognitive spectrum goes more to the reasonfor or cause of the trust,
whereas the generalized-specific spectrum goes more to the object of the trust. In other words,
affective (or cognitive) trust tells us something about why a person has chosen to trust another;
generalized (or specific) trust tells us something about the content or depth of a person's trust in
another. Law would seem to have a greater effect (positive or negative) on that which causes one
person to trust another-than on the specific manifestations of such trust once it comes into play.
Thus, even though I might hold a sense of generalized trust toward a person, if that trust is
cognitively based (meaning: I trust in that person's values and integrity not because of an emotional
or moral instinct, but rather through a calculative assessment of his or her credentials, references,
etc.), legal rules that would help protect me in a transaction with such an individual are likely to
increase my trust in that individual. Conversely, if my trust were affectively based yet specific in
content (meaning: I trust in that person's technical expertise primarily due to instinctual, emotional
reasons), the imposition of legal rules upon our relationship is likely to undermine my trust in that
person-by putting distance between us and transforming the nature of our relationship (thereby
interfering with the instinctual, emotional connection that generated our trust).
146Cross, supranote 9, at 1498-99.
147See Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1756.
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as those who have served together in the armed forces.148 Of course, it's not
practical, nor necessarily desirable, to put future business partners or
relations together in a foxhole before embarking upon a relationship. But
the further we move away from such a scenario, the more difficult it
becomes to build affective and generalized trust. Thus, to the extent that our
laws construct a thicker, and more ubiquitous safety net under commercial
transactions, the more difficult and slower it becomes to form deep, lasting
bonds of trust.
Frank Cross raises an interesting critique in his compelling article on
trust, which takes aim at the "crowding out" theory. 49 According to Cross,
"[t]he mere existence of the law does not produce some sociological
imperative to use it."s 0 Cross argues that if individuals preferred to predicate
their transactions on trust, they would eschew formal contracts and other
legal protections-yet, by in large, people do not opt for that route."' What
this argument overlooks is a phenomenon common to human nature-and,
perhaps, especially so to every parent who has ever attempted to raise a
disciplined child. There is a tremendous temptation to adopt quick and easy
fixes over more burdensome, tedious solutions despite the fact that the latter
may very well be better in the long run. A toddler crying for his parent's cell
phone can be placated by giving him the cell phone-thereby garnering the
parent a respite of peace and quiet. Or the child may instead be told that he
simply cannot have the cell phone-which may very well trigger an
emotional torrent for quite some time. The former policy brings short term
results, the latter policy is conducive to long term results.
I suggest that the same phenomenon is at work in Cross's observation
that people generally opt for the protections of law over the greater risks of
relying on trust alone. Building and developing trust is hard, and sometimes
stressful work. It also takes time and commitment. Although, by most
accounts, the end product is well worth the effort, many people and
businesses would rather not commit their time and energy to such a
process-or are simply short-sighted. This does not evidence a rejection of
the proposition that "trust is preferable to law."'52 For it is not trust per se
that is being eschewed, but rather the trust-development process.

48

1 Cf Irene E. Van Der Kloet et al., Development of Trust among Soldierson a Deployment

Mission, 15 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 131, 137-55 (2004) (discussing the results of a study
relating to the development of trust among soldiers at various stages in their deployment).
49Cross, supra note 9, at 1499.
5'Id
152ld
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Yet another critique is that "by reducing the risk of relying on others,
regulation starts relationships in which trust can eventually develop."'" This
critique has intuitive appeal. After all, as previously indicated, rare is the
trust that is entirely affective or entirely cognitive-most trust relationships
sit somewhere along a spectrum between those two poles.'54 It would seem
that law-especially law with a light touch-could help an individual
overcome his or her cognitive trust concerns and enter into a business
relationship with another that is primarily affective.
Although Larry Ribstein rejects this critique,'15 I see little problem in
conceding its merit. The protections of regulation may certainly tip the
scales for some individuals, prompting them into trust relationships by
making the vulnerability associated therewith more acceptable. By the same
token, Ribstein is correct in observing that these same protections will also
affect relationships that did not otherwise need them-and for those
particular relationships "[t]he existence of legal coercion means that one no
longer can clearly demonstrate that he respects his promise regardless of selfinterest, but rather can show only that he can be legally coerced into
performing.""' Thus, for these relationships, the law will work to inhibit the
development of trust. Ultimately, it would seem as though the strength of
this critique would lie in the existence of empirical evidence that does not
yet exist: to what extent does law kick-start some trust relationships, versus
smother other potential trust relationships? I surmise that the answer is
dependent upon a number of variables. That said, I read the existing
literature to suggest that the affective trust relationships that are harmed by
such regulation outnumber those that are helped.'"
Lastly, Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson have asserted that the
complexity of law's operation casts doubts upon whether law can be said to
undermine trust.' More specifically, Deakin and Wilkinson point out that
law and regulation serve to influence social norms, which are in turn part of
the mix of factors affecting affective (and generalized) trust.' N. Luhmann
also asserted that law could operate in the background to help foster trust in
society, by "deterring cheating" and providing assurance." However,

53
1 Ribstein, supra note
54
1 See supra Part IA.

19, at 563.

'5See Ribstein, supra note 19, at 563, 582-83.

'5 6Ribstein, supra note 19, at 582.
57
See supra text accompanying notes 133-134.
' 8Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 147.
'"Id. at 154.
"6SeeLane, supra note 55, at 13 (citing NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER 34-36

(Tom Burns & Gianfranco Poggi eds., Howard Davis et al. trans., John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1979)
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Luhmann added the important caveat (omitted from Deakin and Wilkinson's
discussion) that law ceases to function in this regard once "activated.'"6'
"The actual use of legal sanctions, for Luhmann as for most other social
scientists, is incompatible with a trust relationship." 62
The interplay between law and social norms is a controversial, and
imperfectly understood phenomenon."' The degree to which a particular
financial regulation might possibly affect norms in such a way as to
engender affective or generalized trust seems quite uncertain. Although
Deakin and Wilkinson's argument is an interesting one, I find this particular
critique too speculative to credit in light of the countervailing evidence and
arguments.
Finally, even if law and regulation do in fact destroy or diminish
affective and generalized trust, it generally does so while building up
cognitive and specific trust. This certainly diminishes the severity of the
problems posed by the imposition of law and regulation upon relationships
of trust (or of potential trust), but it does not entirely overcome them.
Although cognitive and specific trust are important and helpful forms of
trust, it is critically important to bear in mind that not all trust is created
equal. Cognitive and specific trust are distinctly "lower quality" versions of
trust, of less value to individuals and society than the "higher quality"
varieties of affective and generalized trust.'" For, as mentioned, certain
particular benefits inure to relationships based upon affective and
generalized trust that simply cannot be satisfactorily replicated by cognitive
and specific trust.'6 ' This suggests that we accept the trade off of
cognitive/specific trust in place of affective/generalized trust only when
compelled to do so.
II. SECURITIES REGULATION AND TRUST
In 2008 and 2009, the United States underwent an economic crisis of
historic proportions, a change in presidential administrations, and gave the
Democratic party its largest Congressional majority in over a decade. Not
surprisingly, the confluence of these events has given rise to a variety of
economic reforms and reform proposals-many directed at the regulation of
the securities markets.
(1973)).
161Id.

162d
16 Robert E. Scott, The Limits ofBehavioralTheoriesofLaw andSocial Norms, 86 VA. L.
REv. 1603, 1603-04 (2000).
164See supra Part I.B.
"See supra Part I.B.
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The proposals were initially set forth by the Obama Administration in
June 2009 via the Department of Treasury's "White Paper" on financial
reform: "Financial Regulatory Reform-A New Foundation: Rebuilding
These proposals included: (1)
Financial Supervision and Regulation."'
of the 1940 Investment
exemption
elimination of the "private adviser"
7
Advisers Act; (2) greater regulation of hedge funds,' 5 and (3) the
imposition of fiduciary obligations upon brokers.' 9 Additional detail was
added in July 2009 via the Treasury's delivery to Congress of two pieces of
draft legislation: (1) the "Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act
of 2009",7e and (2) the "Investor Protection Act of 2009."1' These
proposals, in one form or another, have been included in a variety of U.S.
House and Senate bills,'72 which have essentially culminated in the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010'17.
In this part, I shall first proceed to examine the traditional regulatory
regime as it applies to brokers, investment advisers, and hedge finds (the
subjects of the aforementioned proposals).'74 Following each examination, I
shall immediately analyze the merits of the reforms to the traditional regime
brought about by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Investor

1See generally U.S. TREASURY DEP'T., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009) available at

http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReportweb.pdf [hereinafter "White Paper"].
'See id. at 12, 37-38.
'See id. at 5.
See id. at 68, 71.
70

1 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, PRIVATE FUND INVESTMENT ADVISERS REGISTRATION ACT OF

2009 (proposed), available at http:// www.treas.gov./initiatives/regulatoryreform/(follow hyperlink
for "Title IV-Registration of Advisers to Private Funds") [hereinafter Private Fund Investment
Advisers Registration Act of 2009 (proposed)].
U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT OF 2009 (proposed), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/tg205071l09.pdf [hereinafter Investor Protection Act of
2009 (proposed)].
172Private Fund Investors Advisers Registration Act of 2009, H.R. 3818, 11Ith Cong.
(2009); Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. (2009); The Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009) (On Dec. 11, 2009, the
House passed this Act; on Jan. 20, 2010, this legislation was referred to the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs). Related pending legislation includes Return to Prudent
Banking Act of 2009, H.R. 4377, 111th Cong. (2009); Investors Rights and Corporate
Accountability Act of 2009, S. 2813, 11 Ith Cong. (2009); Mutual Fund Transparency Act of 2009,
S. 1964, 11 Ith Cong. (2009); Private Fund Transparency Act of 2009, S. 1276, 111th Cong. (2009).
1'
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
74
1
1The
general U.S. approach to securities regulation is reviewed, from a trust perspective,
in a predecessor article to this one: Ronald J. Colombo, The Role of Trust in Financial Regulation,
55 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
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Protection Act of 2010. My goal shall be to identify whether the traditional
regulation, versus the regulation as reformed, best serves to foster trust.
A. Broker Regulation
1. Traditional Regulation
Brokers play a critically important role in secondary market trading."'
Although a large number of investors are taking advantage of discount
brokerages of late (which offer low-cost, execution-only services online),"'
as of 2008 "43 per cent of individual investors were [still] with full-service
brokers."..
Full-service brokers not only execute customer trades, but also
"provide customers with research analysis and investment advice.""' As
such, the relationship between an investor and his or her (full-service) broker
can be, and often is, a personal one."' Indeed, "[full-service broker-dealers
have always sought to develop long-term relationships with their customers
who often come to rely on them for expert investment advice." 8"
"Broker-dealers are heavily regulated."'"' They are subject to a
panoply of rules and requirements, hailing from the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, FINRA (the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority-a self
regulatory organization that oversees thousands of brokerage firms), and
state law as well."'2
The "keystone of the entire system of broker-dealer regulation" is the
requirement that anyone acting as a broker must register with the SEC."'

75

See RICHARD ROBERTS, WALL STREET 122 (2002).
See id.
77
' Rachel Chang, Self Serve Investors Ditching Brokers: Credit Crunch May Have Been
Lethalfor Big Banks but it Has Been a Bonusfor Small Online Outfits, TORONTO STAR, July 25,
2009, at B02.
' 7"Roberts, supra note 175, at 122.
79
' See Laura S. Unger, On-Line Brokerage: KeepingApace OfCyberspace, in SECURITIES
76

1

LAW & THE INTERNET: DOING BUSINESS IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 2000, at 237,

285 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-i 189,2000) ("In a traditional fullservice brokerage relationship, a customer interested in a security visits or calls his or her registered
representative ..... ).
"'"Certain Broker-Dealers not to be Investment Advisers, Advisers Act Release Nos. 3451523; IA-2376, Fed. Reg. 20424, 20432 (proposed Apr. 19, 2005), vacated by Fin. Planning
Ass'n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
"'Clifford E. Kirsch, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION § 1:2 (2008) WL PLIREF-BDR s
1:2.
182See id
1'1

NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION
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The SEC has explained the importance of the registration requirement, and
the explanation merits being set forth in full:
Registration of market professionals is a key element in the
federal statutory scheme and plays a significant role in
protecting investors. It promotes baseline levels of integrity
among broker-dealers and their personal dealing with investors,
through statutory disqualification provisions and the
Commission's [SEC's] disciplinary authority; retention of
sufficient capital to operate safely, through Commission net
capital requirements; and maintenance of adequate competency
levels, through self-regulatory organization ("SRO")
qualification requirements. In addition, registration brings
broker-dealer firms under extensive recordkeeping and
reporting obligations, special antifraud rules, and the
Commission's broad enforcement authority over broker-dealers.
That authority, in turn, helps assure that investors in the U.S.
securities markets are protected by the statutory and regulatory
provisions governing the U.S. securities industry. Moreover,
the Commission's financial supervision of all entities
participating in the interdependent network of securities
professionals contributes to the financial soundness of this
nation's securities markets.'"
In addition to the registration requirement and all that it entails, as set
forth above,' the "suitability doctrine" constitutes a second major
component governing the broker-client relationship."I Explicitly set forth as
a rule by FINRA, and recognized by the SEC as a "fundamental duty of
brokers" enforceable under the securities laws' general antifraud rule (Rule
1Ob-5),'" the suitability doctrine demands that a broker/brokerage firm "will
make specific recommendations of securities only if it has a reasonable basis
for believing that they are suitable for the customer.""'

§ 5.01

(4th
ed. 2010) (quoting Roth v. SEC, 22 F.3d 1108, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
184 d. (quoting Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act
Release No. 25,801 [1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,244, at 89,192 (June 14,
1988) 1988 WL 1000013).
85
1 See supra text accompanying note 184.
' 86See Kirsch, supranote 181, § 6:1.1.
"See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2006).
'8 8Kirsch, supra note 181, § 6:1.1; see also id. § 6:1.2 (discussing the factors that go into
determining the suitability of an investment for a customer).
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Thus, to summarize, brokers who execute trades and/or provide
investment advice to clients are subject to the following regulations (among
others):
* Mandatory registration
*

Qualification requirements

*

Net capital requirements

*

Recordkeeping requirements

*

Antifraud rules

*

The Suitability Doctrine

As the broker-client relationship can be (and often is) a personal one
(outside of the context of discount brokers),'" the ground is fertile for the
development of affective and generalized trust. The thicket of regulations
governing this relationship, however, would seem to choke off the air and
space needed for such trust to grow. The broker has little room in which to
demonstrate his or her trustworthiness, qualifications, or other like
characteristics that could possibly give rise to the type of bonding, and the
type of feelings, that form the basis of affective and generalized trust.'o
Instead, the broker is left, it would seem, with only enough space to
demonstrate his or her technical abilities via superior customer service and
superior securities recommendations. This, of course, represents an
opportunity to develop cognitive and specific trust."' And in this respect,
the regulatory thicket supports, rather than undermines, the development of
such trust.
Whether, from a trust perspective, broker regulation hits the mark
depends upon one's view of the role of brokers in the securities marketplace.
If viewed as a mere functionary-a simple agent beholden to his/her
principal's commands' 9 2-then, perhaps, the richness of affective and/or

'8 9See supra text accompanying notes 178-180.

190See supra text accompanying notes 23-27, 48-51.
' 9'See supra text accompanying notes 28-37, 48-52.
'9 E.g., DOUGLAS CAMPBELL, THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS 13 (2nd ed.1927):

A stockbroker is one who is employed to buy or sell stocks, bonds, and other
securities, receiving a commission as compensation for his services. In making the
purchase, or sale, he acts as the agent of the person for whom it is made, and in
that capacity he has an interest in the transaction only to the extent of his
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generalized trust may be an unnecessary luxury. Pursuant to this
perspective, an investor's decision to open a brokerage account at a particular
brokerage firm does not represent a leap of faith in the judgment and morals
of that firm's brokers. Rather, it represents simply a convenient means by
which to purchase and sell securities. The investor's trust in this scenario is
limited to confidence in the brokerage firm's ability to execute trades in a
timely fashion, to maintain accurate records of his or her account, and to
refrain from defrauding him or her. Indeed, if the investor is trading
exclusively through an online account, it is possible that he or she may never
even make personal contact with anyone at the brokerage firm-let alone a
real, live broker. By heavily regulating brokers and brokerage firms, the
securities laws arguably instill trust in them (cognitive and specific) and
thereby encourage investors to open and utilize brokerage accounts.
And such a perspective may very well be the appropriate one, given
trends within the industry.' As Charles Schwab, founder and chairman of
the Charles Schwab Corporation explained:
My company. . .was founded 35 years ago as a reaction to the
high cost and inherent exclusivity of traditional Wall Street
investing. Today we serve almost 10 million accounts. The
majority are what we refer to as self-directed: They make their
own decisions about what to buy, sell or hold. We provide
them with an efficient platform, tools, assistance, education
and, of course, low costs.... To be sure, we are happy to
manage money for our clients. But millions of investors have
decided that their needs are best served when they direct their
own finances.'94
However, another sound perspective is also possible. Under this
alternative perspective, the full-service broker, not the discount broker, is the
model. Pursuant to this perspective, a broker does not simply execute orders
at a client's command, but rather renders investment advice to the client, and
may even manage the client's account (which may include "authorization to
trade without the [client's] prior consent").' Such brokers are not simply
functionaries, but rather "are clearly fiduciaries in the broadest sense."'
commission.
3

0 See supra text

accompanying notes 176-77.
1 E.g., Charles R. Schwab, Brokers Aren't Responsible for Bad Bets, WALL ST. J.,
94

Aug. 19, 2009, at A15.
'"Joseph L. Hood Jr., Arbitration and Litigation of Public Customers' Claims Against
Broker-Dealers After McMahon, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 541, 561 (1988).
196Id.
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Under this perspective, one would like to see the development of affective
and generalized trust, for all the reasons referred to earlier.'" For here, the
broker necessarily exercises quite a bit of discretion-discretion which is
difficult to efficiently regulate via law.'" This same discretion also gives rise
to a myriad of ways in which a client can be harmed by his or her broker,
ranging from simple fraud, to unsuitable recommendations, to churning.'" It
is precisely in such circumstances that affective and generalized trust
becomes so valuable.2 " For investors recognize their irreducible quantum of
vulnerability here, and trust-especially affective and generalized trust,
which goes not merely to competence but to overall honesty-serves best to
assuage their legitimate concerns.
From this second perspective, the law regulating brokers may, in fact,
be problematic. For, as discussed, the heavy hand of regulation can crowd
out trust in a relationship, converting expectations and behavior based upon
honor and integrity to those based upon the letter of the law.20 ' This suggests
that the law tread lightly upon the broker-client relationship, regulating only
to the degree absolutely necessary, and leaving the greatest amount of
latitude for affective and generalized trust to develop. As presently
constructed, this is not how most would characterize the regulation of
broker-dealers.202
Both perspectives are justifiable, as both types of broker-client
relationships exist. From what we know about trust however, the law
operates to decisively favor one such paradigm here over the other (namely,
that of the discount-broker). Whether such operation is sensible, given
industry trends, or whether such operation is in fact responsible for industry
trends, remains an interesting and open question.
2. Reforms
The White Paper proposed that Congress enable the SEC to
"[e]stablish a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers offering investment advice

97

1

See supra Part I.C.

See Colombo, supra note 86, at 760-64 (setting forth the limits of law's ability to
effectively regulate misconduct and wrongdoing).
'"E.g., Seth E. Lipner, The Law ofChurning,in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1999, at 309,

313 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 10-0092, 1999), WL 1131 PLI/Corp
309 (describing the practice of churning in which the broker initiates excessive transactions for the
customer for his own benefit).
"See supra Part I.C.
2o1See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
22
0 See Kirsch, supra note 181, at § 1:2.
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and harmonize the regulation of investment advisers and broker-dealers." 203
As the White Paper accurately noted: "investment advisers and brokerdealers are regulated under different statutory and regulatory frameworks,
even though the services they provide often are virtually identical from a
retail investor's perspective." 21 Although each set ofprofessionals may give
investment advice to their clients, investment advisers are subject to a
fiduciary duty when giving such advice, but broker-dealers are not. 205
Instead, broker-dealers are subject to the lower standard of "suitability,"
pursuant to which a broker-dealer "will make specific recommendations of
securities only if it has a reasonable basis for believing that they are suitable
for the customer. "206
The White Paper basically argued that investment advice is investment
advice, regardless of its source.2 ' It also asserts (probably accurately) that
"[r]etail customers repose the same degree of trust in their brokers as they do
in investment advisers, but the legal responsibilities of the intermediaries
may not be the same."2 0s This argues strongly in favor of a consistent legal
standard, and the standard advanced is the one currently governing
investment advisers.209
The proposed Investor Protection Act of 2009 set forth the language
that would bring about this harmonization of standards.210 Specifically, in
the words of the proposed act:
[T]he standards of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers, in providing investment advice about
securities to retail customers or clients (and such other
customers or clients as the Commission may by rule provide),
shall be to act solely in the interest of the customer or client
without regard to the financial or other interest of the broker,
dealer or investment adviser providing the advice.21 1

203

White Paper, supra note 166, at 71.

204,d

205

See id
206Kirsch,
supra note 181, § 6:1.1.
207
See White Paper, supra note 166, at 71.
208id

m0See id. at 72.

21

OSee Investor Protection Act of 2009 (proposed), supra note 171, at 4-5.
at 4. See also Jane J. Kim, FiduciaryDuty Hits the Street--Sort of WALL ST.
J.,
Aug. 29, 2009, at BI (noting the disagreement between those advocating for a uniform federal
standard of fiduciary duty and those favoring existing standards).
21Id
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Additionally, as mentioned, the proposed Act would have required the
SEC to promulgate certain disclosures on the part of brokers to investors
regarding "the terms of their relationships," and even, "where appropriate ...
promulgate rules prohibiting sales practices, conflicts of interest, and
compensation schemes . .. contrary to the public interest and the interests of
investors."212The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010,213 which President Obama signed into law on July 21 2010,214
does not go as far as its predecessor proposals. Instead, the Dodd-Frank Act
merely requires the SEC to undertake a study as to the merits of imposing a
fiduciary duty upon brokers, and authorizes the SEC to impose such a duty
via regulatory rulemaking should it deem it appropriate to do so. 215
The call to harmonize the standards governing broker and investmentadviser client relationships has much merit. So does the call for greater
regulation of sales practices, conflicts, and compensation. But, from the
narrow perspective of trust enhancement, would such harmonization be a
wise move?
As previously discussed, broker-dealers are already heavily
regulated."' Regardless of the wisdom of such a regime from a trust
perspective, its existence is a matter of fact, and leaves little room in which
the higher quality forms of trust could develop. In light of this, it is difficult
to see the harm of the additional regulatory impositions. Indeed, in light of
such an inhospitable environment for affective and generalized trust, it
would be wise to maximize cognitive/specific trust. Fortunately, such are
the precise effects that the proposed reforms would be predicted to have.217
For the reforms in question serve to reduce the risk of entering into a
financial relationship with a broker (by imposing a heightened standard of
conduct, and other regulatory strictures aimed at protecting the investor).

212Investor Protection Act of 2009 (proposed), supra note 171, at 4-5; see also infra text
accompanying note 235-39 (outlining how the SEC would regulate investment advisers to protect
investors).
213
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
214See Jesse Lee, PresidentObamaSigns Wall Street Reform: "No Easy Task," THE WHrE

HoUSE BLOG (July 21, 2010, 2:22 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/21/ presidentobama-signs-wall-street-reform-no-easy-task.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376, § 913(f), (g) (2010).
216
See supra Part Hl.A.
217Additionally, some scholars have argued that fiduciary duties can enhance affective trust
as well, for "[t]here is less for a principal to inquire about" and thus there are "fewer (potentially
trust-eroding) inquiries [that] need be made." Hill & O'Hara, supranote 21, at 1760; see also Blair
& Stout, supra note 9, at 1785-86 (discussing the situations in which fiduciary relationships created
by law can encourage trust).
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This reduces the cost component of the cost-benefit equation at the heart of
cognitive/specific trust.
B. Regulation ofInvestment Advisers
1. Traditional Regulation
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940"' defines "[i]nvestment adviser"
as "any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
others . . . as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling

securities."219 The Act excludes from the definition those whose investment
advice is only "incidental" to their main line of business,220 and it is pursuant
to this exemption that brokers (among others) escape the Act's strictures.
Also exempt from some of the Act's requirements (namely, its
registration requirement, but not from the definition of an "investment
adviser") is "any investment adviser who during the course of the preceding
twelve months has had fewer than fifteen clients and who neither holds
himself out generally to the public as an investment adviser nor acts as an
investment adviser to any investment company. ... ""'(the "private adviser"

exemption)222 Among other things, this exemption serves to exempt advisers
to a limited number of hedge funds, family members, venture capital, and
private equity funds from the Act's registration requirements.223
As with broker-dealers, investment advisers are "heavily regulated." 224
As mentioned, non-exempt advisers must register with the SEC,225 which
requires the submission of a Form ADV. 26 Additionally, advisers subject to
the registration requirement must, among other things, maintain detailed
books and records,227 provide certain written disclosures to their clients,228

2Investment
2 19

1d

Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to - 21 (2006).

§ 80b-2(a)(l 1).

22od

221

Id

§ 80b-3(b)(3).

222

See Matthew Goldstein, A Secret Society: HedgeFundsAnd Their Mysterious Success, 6

J.INT'L Bus. & L. 111, 120-25 (2007).
223
Shearman & Sterling LLP, Obama Administration Proposes Investment Adviser
Legislationto U.S. Congress, 2-3 July 22, 2009, http://www.shearnan.com/obama-administrationproposes-investment-adviser-legislation-to-us-congress/ (then follow the "click here to view the full
memo, Obama administration proposes Investment Adviser Legislation to U.S. Congress"
hyperlink).
224
William A. Birdthistle, CompensatingPower: An Analysis ofRents andRewards in the
Mutual FundIndustry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1408 (2006).
22515 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a).
22617 C.F.R. §2 75. 2 03-1(a)
22717 C.F.R. §275.204-2
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"establish, maintain and enforce a written code of ethics."' Finally, all
advisers are held to a fiduciary duty standard, and as such possess "an
affirmative duty of 'utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all
material facts,' as well as an affirmative obligation'to employ reasonable care
to avoid misleading' [their] clients."230
Analysis of the law's traditional approach to investment advisers
largely replicates the analysis undertaken with regard to brokers.23 ' Both sets
of investment professionals are heavily regulated, leaving little room for
affective and generalized trust to develop in the first place. Yet one could
foresee the natural development of affective and generalized trust in
relationships between both sets of investment professionals and their clients
were some of this regulation pared back-for all the building blocks of such
a relationship appear to be in place.232
I expressed a degree of ambivalence concerning the heavy regulation
of brokers because of the apparently shifting business model of the industry
from full-service brokers to discount brokers."' For with this shift comes a
reduced ability to form bonds of affective and generalized trust, thereby
justifying a regulatory approach that substantially skews in favor of cognitive
and specific trust. But within the context of investment advisers, no such
dichotomy exists; there is no movement toward a "discount" investment
adviser model. As such, from a trust perspective, my view of the regulatory
approach toward investment advisers is less ambiguous and more critical.
For it would seem as though law and regulation are promoting
cognitive/specific trust at the expense of affective/generalized trust in the
absence of a compelling reason to do so.
Within the investment adviser industry, the possibility of affective and
generalized trust would appear to be at its greatest among those investment
advisers who have the smallest number of clients. One would expect such
advisers, ceteris paribus, to have closer, more personal, and more lasting
relationships with their small number of clients than those advisers with a
much larger client base. Interestingly, here the law somewhat facilitates the
development of this trust by recognizing the aforementioned exemption from
22817 C.F.R. §275.204-3.
22917 C.F.R. §275.204A-1.

230SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 191-95 (1963) (quoting WILLUAM
L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 535 (2d ed. 1955) and 1 HARPER AND JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS 541 (1956)); see also Hristiyaniya Atanasova, The Scope of Investment Advisers'
FiduciaryDuties When They Merge, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 509, 512-14 (2008).
231See supra Part IIA.
Namely, repeated interpersonal interactions over long periods of time, coupled with the
client's vulnerability and dependence upon the adviser/broker.
233
See supra Part H.A.
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the registration (and certain other) requirements of the 1940 Investment
Advisers for advisers with fewer than 15 clients.234 From a trust perspective,
this is a laudable carve-out. It enables the greatest degree of investor
vulnerability in that space where such vulnerability is most likely to fuel the
development of trust.
2. Reforms
Arguing that "there is a compelling investor protection rationale to fill
the gaps in the regulation of investment advisors [sic] and the funds that they
manage,"235 the White Paper proposed "[r]equiring the SEC registration of
investment advisers to hedge funds and other private pools of capital." 236
The proposed Private Funds Investment Registration Act would accomplish
this by eliminating the aforementioned "private adviser" exemption
contained in § 203(b) of the 1940 Investment Advisers Act.2 37 The effect of
this proposed legislation would be to require all investment advisers "to
private funds with at least $30 million in assets under management to
register with the SEC,"2 38 regardless of the adviser's number of clients. Less
significantly, but potentially quite significant nonetheless, the Act would
also require the SEC to:
(1) take steps to facilitate the provision of simple and clear
disclosures to investors regarding the terms of their
relationships with investment professionals; and (2) examine
and, where appropriate, promulgate rules prohibiting sales
practices, conflicts of interest, and compensation schemes for
financial intermediaries (including brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers) that it deems contrary to the public
interest and the interests of investors.3
Recall that an adviser's obligation to register with the SEC triggers a
trio of other regulatory requirements:

234

See supra text accompanying notes 221-223.
5See White Paper, supra note 166, at 37.

23

236

1d.

237

See Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009 (proposed), supra note
170, at 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 222-223.
238
See Shearman & Sterling LLP, supra note 223, at 2. An exception would also be
recognized for certain non-U.S. investment advisers. See id.at 3.
2391nvestor Protection Act of 2009 (proposed), supranote 171, at 4-5,
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the maintenance of detailed books and records; 240
the provision of certain written client disclosures; 241and
the establishment of a written code of ethics.242

Additionally, all advisers, whether exempt from registration (and its
associated requirements) or not, are held to a fiduciary duty standard vis-Avis their client interactions.243
These proposals were enacted into law under the Dodd-Frank Act.2"
The Dodd-Frank Act eliminates the aforementioned "private advisor"
exception245 (but replaces it with some narrower exceptions of its own).246
The Act also requires the SEC to facilitate enhanced disclosures, and to
prohibit certain sales practices "contrary to the public interest" as per the
proposed Private Funds Investment Registration Act quoted above.247
In assessing the current regulatory approach to investment advisers, I

observed that law was probably hampering the development of affective and
generalized trust in an area where such trust could most likely develop.2 48 1
also observed, however, that the exemption for private advisers serves to
carve out a small space-and, fortuitously, the most appropriate space-for
such trust to grow.2 49 Elimination of this exemption reduces this opportunity.
Imposition of disclosures setting forth the terms of investment adviser-client
relationships, along with regulation of sales practices, conflicts, and
compensation, further eliminates this opportunity. Thus, the proposed
reform is a deleterious move if one favors increased affective and
generalized trust in the financial adviser industry.

24017

C.F.R. §275.204-2.

24117 C.F.R.
24217

§275.204-3.

C.F.R. §275.204A-1.

243See Atanasova, supra note 230, at 512-13; see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 191-95 (1963).
244Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376, §§ 1053(c)(3)(A), 403 (2010).
245
See supra text accompanying notes 221-222.
246
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
24Id. § 743; see supra text accompanying note 239.
248
See supra text accompanying notes 233-34.
249

See id.
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C. Hedge FundRegulation
1. Traditional Regulation
Perhaps the entities least regulated in the world of financial services
are hedge funds. Originally created decades ago "as a speculative tool used
for conservative purposes,"250 the hedge fund has reached "near-mythical
status in the securities industry, inspiring feelings of admiration and
fascination but also envy and fear in many people."25 ' Although, in the
words of its creator, the hedge fund was devised to "hedge against the
vagaries of the market"252 (hence its name), hedge funds today employ a
variety of strategies in pursuit of robust returns, usually characterized by
"[h]igh leverage, management expertise, performance fees, and absolute
return strategies. "253
There is no single definition of a "hedge fund," and the term is not
defined by U.S. securities laws.254 That said, a common definition is "any
pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized, administered by
professional investment managers, and not widely available to the public. "2
What has made hedge funds the subject of fascination and controversy
is, in large part, their "secrecy"256 and relative lack of regulatory oversight.257
For, aside from the imposition of basic antifraud liability, hedge funds have
traditionally been largely unregulated.258 This lack of regulatory oversight
comports well with the original legislative intent of U.S. securities law.259
Congress acted with "the specific purpose of protecting the common
layperson investor, unfamiliar with the complexities of the financial
markets," whereas more sophisticated investors were expected to fend for

25oEvan M. Gilbert, Unnecessary Reform: The Fallacieswith and Alternatives to SEC
Regulation ofHedge Funds, 2 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 319, 319-20 (2009).
2 51
Thierry Olivier Desmet, UnderstandingHedge FundAdviser Regulation, 4 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 1, 1 (2008).
252Peter Landau, Alfred Winslow Jones: The Long and Short of the Founding Father,
INVESTOR, (Aug. 1968).
INSTTUTIONAL
2 53
j.W. Verret, Dr.Jones and the RaidersofLost Capital: Hedge Fund Regulation, Part
II, A Self-Regulation Proposal,32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799, 803 (2007).
2 54
255See Gilbert, supra note 250, at 321.
1d. (quoting Alfred C. Tierney, The SEC's Rule 206(4)-8: Two Steps Back andOne Step
Forward,44 CAL. W. L. REV. 589, 593-94 (2008)).
2 56
Desmet, supranote 251, at 1-2.
257
See id. at 13.
2
ss1d at 13-15. In 2004, the SEC promulgated a rule requiring hedge fund registration, but
that rule was subsequently quashed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See id.at 1524.
25
9See Gilbert, supranote 250, at 322-23.
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themselves.260 For the most part, investors in hedge funds are sophisticated,
and if not, certainly have access to sophisticated investment advice:
traditional hedge funds "have steep investment minimums, from $1 million
to as high as $50 million per investor."261
From a trust perspective, the lack of hedge fund regulation seems
sensible. As with the world of investment advisers, the hedge fund industry
is marked by repeat players, generally drawn from a similar social milieu.262
The frequent and historical interactions among these players lays the
Given the
foundation for affective and generalized trust to develop.'
superiority of affective and generalized trust, legislators and regulators have
been wise in leaving the hedge fund industry alone.
2. Reforms
In connection with its argument that "there is a compelling investor
protection rationale to fill the gaps in the regulation of investment advisors
and the funds that they manage,"2" the White Paper proposed "that all
investment funds advised by an SEC-registered investment adviser should be
subject to recordkeeping requirements; requirements with respect to

260

ld
261Desmet, supra note 251, at 4, 8-9. That said, the "retailization of hedge funds," pursuant

to which an investor can buy into a "funds of funds" for as low as $25,000, has "created [additional]
serious concerns that the hedge fund industry is too lightly regulated." Id. at 4, 9-10. But see
Gilbert, supra note 250, at 338-40 (setting forth reasons why "retailization is not a valid concern"
supportive of additional hedge fund regulation).
262Desmet, supra note 251, at 8. See also Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1786-87
(discussing how corporate directors and CEOs "often belong to the same clubs, associations, and
charities"); see also Steve Cocheo, The glass corner office: While no longer exclusively a man's
world, is banking an equally woman-friendly business yet?, ABA BANKING J., (Oct. 2001)

(discussing the role of women in the banking industry), available at http://www.allbusiness.com
/finance/826351-1.html; see also Patricia H. Thornton, The Sociology ofEntrepreneurship,25 ANN.

REV. Soc. 19, 31-33 (1999) (noting the relationship between funding of new business ventures and
the sociological attributes of the regions in which they occur). Cf Ranjay Gulati & Monica C.
Higgins, Which Ties Matter When? The ContingentEffects ofInterorganizationalPartnershipson

IPO Success, 24 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 127, 129-32 (2003) (discussing the benefits of
interorganizational endorsement relationships and alliances between firms). See generallyMark S.
Mizruchi & Linda Brewster Stearns, Getting Deals Done: The Use ofSocial Networks in Bank

Decision-Making,66 AM. Soc. REV. 647, 648-51 (2001) (examining how commercial banks close
transactions using social networks).
263
Cf Alan Fish & Daniel New, Investment Performance Reporting:From Obligationto
Differentiator,HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Sep. 11, 2008, availableat 2008 WLNR 17284494

(noting how firms in the investment management industry can benefit from the adoption of uniform
standards relating to the presentation of investment results).
264See White Paper, supra note 166, at 37.
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disclosures to investors, creditors, and counterparties; and regulatory

reporting requirements." 26 5
Although nothing replicating the White Paper's approach made it very
far in Congress, the Private Funds Investment Registration Act proposed to
accomplish much of the same objectives (concerning hedge fund regulation)
indirectly, by requiring that investment advisers to hedge funds "maintain
such records of and file with the Commission such reports regarding private
funds advised by the investment adviser as are necessary or appropriate in
the public interest and for the . .. assessment of systemic risk.... 11266 This is
precisely the approach adopted by the Dodd-Frank Act.267
The regulation of hedge funds has been a subject of debate and
controversy even before the current economic crisis.268 It is not the purpose
of this article to rehash or take sides in that debate. But, in terms of
assessing whether such regulation is trust-enhancing or trust-diminishing, for
reasons previously expressed, the latter would seem to be the case.269
Indeed, under the traditional regime, although not heavily regulated,
"hedge funds are permitted to voluntarily subject themselves to SEC
regulation."2 70 Such a voluntary approach, especially within the context of
the hedge fund industry, seems optimal from a trust-enhancing perspective.
It enables those funds that have managed to develop a critical mass of
affective and generalized trust to continue operating on the basis of such
trust-without interference from law and regulation. It also enables those
funds which, for whatever reason, have been unable to gain traction in the
development of affective and generalized trust, to avail themselves of the
next best thing: cognitive and specific trust via voluntary subjection to SEC
regulation. Removal of this choice, by effectively mandating the regulation
of all hedge funds, risks sacrificing the affective/generalized trust
relationships forged by the former group of hedge funds-a trust that their
current particular context enables them to nurture and maintain.

265

id
Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009, H.R. 3818, 111th Cong.
§4(b)1 (2009).
26 7
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376, § 619 (2010).
268
E.g., Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681,
681-82 (2000).
269
See supraPart.I.C.
270
Gilbert, supra note 250, at 343.
266
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III. PROBLEMS WITH TRUST
This article's premise has been the indispensability of trust to our
economy as a whole, and to capital markets in particular. Without retreating
from that premise, it is important to nevertheless acknowledge that trust is
not an unmixed blessing."' For in addition to the beneficial opportunities
and efficiencies that trust engenders, there is an accompanying set of
nefarious opportunities and exploitations that it enables as well."' Trust can
be honored, or breached; rewarded, or abused. This is largely inescapable,
and arises from the fact that, as discussed, vulnerability is at trust's core.273
Additionally, trust can also play a role in undermining regulatory
oversight, as was made clear by the SEC's internal investigation into its
handling of the Madoff scandal.274 The SEC's investigation revealed that an
important factor in explaining why SEC staff failed to uncover the Madoff
7 This led to an unfortunate degree of trust
scheme was Madoffs reputation."
in Madoff on the part of the SEC's staff, causing them to credit his
unsubstantiated representations."'6
Thus, a public policy approach that encourages and promotes trustespecially affective and generalized trust-will also, simultaneously, and
inevitably, be opening up greater numbers of people to victimization. This
presents a very real dilemma. Moreover, in the financial services industry,
this problem is compounded by the fact that an investor suffers not only if he
or she places trust in the wrong person or institution, but also (quite often) if
that person or institution misplaces its trust in another person or institution.
That is, not only must an investor hope that his or her broker (for example) is
genuinely trustworthy, but also that the broker's choices of whom to trust
with the investor's money are also correct.
This dilemma is not unique to trust, but appears in a variety of
contexts. A vaccine that will save millions of lives may also cause the death
of hundreds who suffer from serious side effects. Trains, planes, and
automobiles all make possible life as we know it, yet all are subject to

m'Among other potential ills, societies and communities high in trust can also exhibit
xenophobic tendencies regarding those outside their circles of trust. See Cross, supra note 9, at
1528-34.
272See Stout, supranote 94, at 8, 12; Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1719-20.
273See
supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
274
SEC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO
UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME 372-89 (2009).
5
27 See id. at 389.
276See id.at 372-73. A similar phenomenon has apparently been at work in the boardrooms
of U.S. corporations in which "directors failed to look hard and well enough because they trusted too
much in the officers." Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1786.
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accidents and mishaps that will claim life from time to time. Society's
solution to these dilemmas is regulation. Regulation attempts to maximize
the benefit of a good, while minimizing its potential harms. Thus, we permit
(and indeed, encourage) inoculation by vaccine, but only after testing for
side effects, and warning those most at risk of the side effects. We allow the
use of automobiles, but demand that automobiles meet certain crash-test and
safety requirements, be driven subject to posted speed limits, etc.
What is unique about trust, however, is that the imposition of a
regulatory solution, as discussed, can be particularly counterproductive.277
Requiring front-row automobile passengers to wear seat belts improves
automobile safety-at the cost of only a minor inconvenience and few
additional dollars per car.278 Imposing additional regulatory requirements
upon investment advisers in order to protect against breaches of trust will not
only probably cost a bit of time and money, but might also very well reduce
trust itself.279 For as explained throughout this article, regulation generally
has the effect of increasing one form of trust (cognitive and specific trust) at
the expense of another, more beneficial form of trust (affective and
generalized).280 This makes a regulatory solution to misplaced trust
problematic.
Many argue in favor of market-based solutions to problems such as
these, in lieu of regulation.281 Whatever the merits of these arguments may
be, the superiority of such solutions is difficult to imagine in this particular
context. For so long as someone or something intervenes between a
financial professional and his or her client, affective/generalized trust will be
undermined. It matters little whether the actor intervening is a government
regulator, or an independent third party professional. Indeed, as previously
mentioned, even privately negotiated contracts between two parties can serve
to reduce the amount of (affective/generalized) trust in their relationship.282

277See supraPart I.D.
278

See Jason Eberhart-Phillips, What I Learned First-HandAbout Seat Belts, KANSAS
HEALTH INSTITUTE, Feb. 23, 2010, http://www.khi.org/news/2010/feb/23/what-i-leaned-first-handabout-seat-belts/.
279
See supraPart II.B.
28oSee supraPart I.D.
281E.g., Ian Vasquez, The Brady Plan and Market-BasedSolutions to Debt Crises, THE
CATO JOURNAL, http://www.cato.org/pubs/journalcjl6n2.html (follow "The Brady Plan and
Market-Based Solutions to Debt Crises" hyperlink) (discussing the use of a free market approach to
resolve the debt crises that resulted from the inability of Mexico to honor its debt obligations); cf
Frankel, supra note 87, at 472 (discussing "private sector professionals and organizations with
significant reputations, which act as reliable verifiers of others' assertions of facts and promises").
282
See supra notes 127-28.
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Thus, a market-based solution to this particular problem involves similar
deleterious trade-offs as does a regulatory solution.283
In light of this, there is indeed little we can do to protect against the
abuse of trust if we wish to maximize the benefits of trust in our society.
Bernie Madoff is the price we pay for the benefits of trust. Although that
price is indeed a steep one, it is dwarfed in comparison to the rewards reaped
in countless relationships where trust is kept instead of broken.2 8 We could
certainly do more to prevent future Madoffs, but our efforts would come at
the cost of weakening trust in those tremendously beneficial relationships
that are flourishing now-and which will develop and flourish in the future.
Of course, it should be noted that efforts to maximize the benefits of
trust do not counsel in favor of an extremely deregulatory position. For it
would do well to recall at this point the fact that trust is unlikely to exist in
an extreme, pure form.285 Thus, even a relationship characterized by a high
degree of affective/generalized trust likely has a component of
cognitive/specific trust as well.286 One could draw from this an inference
(not a necessary inference, but a fair one), that, in the complete absence of
any cognitive/specific trust, even a relationship that would ordinarily be
highly trusting (on affective/generalized grounds) would not long endure as
such. Indeed, as previously mentioned, "[t]here is no question that
institutions like contract and commercial law are necessary preconditions for
the emergence of a modern industrial economy. No one would argue that
trust or moral obligation alone can take their place."287 This suggests the
wisdom of public policy doing what it can to ensure at least a modicum of
cognitive/specific trust in the financial services industry-whether this is
provided by market forces, or in their absence, via law and/or regulation.
But these considerations are moot because we already have more than
a sufficient foundation to support cognitive and specific trust in the financial
services industry. It seems quite implausible to suggest that the industry is
so completely devoid of cognitive/specific trust that affective/generalized
trust cannot exist. 28 8 Wall Street, for all its recent excesses, is a far cry from
the Wild West. Financial professionals are generally well educated,
selectively hired, and subject to a host of both private and public

See Hall, supra note 13, at 510; but see Ribstein, supra note 19, at 570 (arguing that
private constraints may not be as deleterious to trust as legal regulation).
2
9See Cross, supra note 9, at 1474-75, 1477-79; Hill & O'Hara, supra note 21, at 1719.
285

See supra notes 45-46.
See id.

286
287

See Fukuyama, supranote 9, at 151.
288See Stout, supra note 94, at 9 ("One of the most remarkable things we can [say] about
trust . .. is just how much trust is out there").
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credentialing organizations."' Thus, we are not operating in an environment
in which law and regulation are needed to make possible
affective/generalized trust; the predicate for such trust already exists.
IV. CONCLUSION
Trust is a critically important ingredient in the recipes for a successful
economy and a well-functioning financial services industry. Due to scandals
ranging in nature from massive incompetence to massive irresponsibility to
massive fraud; investor trust is in shorter supply today than just a couple of
years ago.290 This is troubling, and commentators, policymakers, and
industry leaders have all recognized the need for trust's restoration.
As in times of similar crises, many have turned to law and regulation
for the answers to our problems. The imposition of additional regulatory
oversight, safeguards, and remedies, some advocate, can help resuscitate
investor trust. These advocates have it half right.
Trust is complicated, existing in a variety of forms.29 ' Some forms,
predicated primarily upon reasoned calculation (cognitive and specific trust),
respond well to law and regulation.292 But other forms, predicated primarily
upon relationship and emotion (affective and generalized trust), respond
poorly to law and regulation.293 In fact, these latter forms of trust can be
seriously harmed by legal intervention. Unfortunately, these latter forms of
trust also happen to be the most valuable and most beneficial forms-giving
rise to the greatest efficiencies, and inspiring the greatest degrees of
cooperation and sacrifice among those in relationships characterized by their
existence.
Wise policymakers would exhibit a preference for the higher quality
versions of trust. This would generally counsel in favor of a deregulatory
approach to the financial services industry-one in which law and regulation
got out of the way, and enabled relationships between clients and industry
professionals to flourish.

289
Karen Chan & Kathy Sweedler, A Guide to FinancialCredentials,UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS EXTENSION (2007), http://www.ace.illinois.edu/cfe/cfp/CredentiaIsNov07.pdf.

290

See Stout, supranote 94, at 13 ("Unfortunately, over the past decade, American investors
have witnessed innumerable financial scandals of the Enron/Worldcom/Madoff sort.... If trust is
indeed influence by history, as the evidence suggests, investor trust can only be expected to
decline.").
29 1
See Hall, supra note 13, at 525.
292

See id
See id.
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But not always. For when high quality trust is unlikely to exist or
persist, it is essential that the only other game in town-cognitive and
specific trust-be in ready supply. Here, happily, law and regulation can
play a salutary role.294
Thus, the wisest policymakers would carefully assess the nature of
whatever particular trust relationship he or she wishes to strengthen. If the
nature is that of affective or generalized trust, the urge to impose additional
regulation to bolster trust ought to be resisted (indeed, perhaps some
regulatory pruning might actually be called for). If, on the other hand, the
relationship is better characterized as one of cognitive or specific trust,
additional (or more accurately better) regulation could indeed be beneficial.
In light of this, proposals and enactments to reform securities
regulation present a mixed bag. Increased regulation of broker-dealers is
likely to do little harm, as it is unclear whether sufficient room for highquality, affective/generalized trust exists here in the first place. And if, in
the twenty-first century, the brokerage industry relies upon primarily
cognitive and specific trust (due to increased movement toward the discountbroker business model), such increased regulation could be beneficial.
As for increased regulation of investment advisers and hedge funds,
this would seem unwise.295 For here we have the greatest possibility (and
most likely actuality) of high quality trust-trust which the imposition of
additional regulation threatens to enervate.
Lastly, it is important to bear in mind that the existence of trust is
itself not an entirely unmixed blessing. By definition, trusting investors are
vulnerable investors. And since vulnerability entails costs, trust entails
costs. Misplaced trust can lead to victimization and serious harm.
Unfortunately, this places us within the horns of a dilemma: our only way to
reduce these costs is to increase regulation, thereby displacing high quality
trust with lower quality trust. That would cause us to forgo the full extent of
benefits that trust (high quality trust) offers to us and to society.
Sadly, for a variety of reasons this trade-off may be, ultimately,
inevitable. For quite some time, those characteristics that most readily give
rise to high quality trust have been diminishing in our society."' Coupled

294

See Hall, supra note 13, at 523 (observing the bias toward cognitive trust approaches in
business law, which is sensible given that trust in this context generally "arises more from
calculation than emotion").
295
1t is important to recognize, as one must throughout this article, that the perspective here
is one limited to the enhancement of trust. Certainly other objectives and policy concerns are being
addressed by all the regulations, both current and proposed, that have been discussed-some of
which might very well outweigh the issue of trust and, on balance, militate in the regulation's favor.
296See supra text accompanying notes 55-66.
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with the recent spate of scandals and economic calamity-a mere decade
after the last spate of scandals and economic calamity-perhaps all that
realistically remains in the financial services industry generally, and in the
securities industry in particular, is the lower quality varieties of trust.
Fortunately, that will suffice, and the capital markets, as well as the economy
as a whole, will be operable. Unfortunately, that settles us into a place far
inferior to that which could have been possible.

